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The federal law of wildlife has mushroomed during the past decade.
Congress, in instances where certain species were suffering population
crises, shed its historic reluctance to interfere with state wildlife manage-
ment prerogatives. Opposition to federal intrusion has raised important
constitutional issues, only some of which have been resolved definitively.
Already the Congress and the courts have discarded some traditional as-
sumptions about wildlife management, and the walls surrounding the tra-
ditional state prerogative to control resident wildlife are tumbling down.
The fundamental question involves the extent to which the United States
government constitutionally can regulate human activities that affect
fauna and flora. Other intertangled issues concern the proper allocation of
regulatory jurisdiction between federal and state governments within the
framework of the United States Constitution. This article explores these
constitutional issues.
I. INTRODUCTION: WILDLIFE AND THE CONSTITUTION
IN COURT
Determination of the limits of federal and state power to regulate the
human activities that affect wildlife populations is not solely an academic
exercise. Many significant private interests are directly or indirectly af-
fected by wildlife regulation. 1 Sport hunters and fishermen, numbering in
the millions, are often passionately attached to their sport and will rise up
in protest against any attempt to curtail it beyond normal conservation
regulations. 2 Even more numerous are the non-consumptive users, partic-
ularly birdwatchers and photographers. There are also, of course, some
Americans who still rely on terrestrial wildlife as a primary food source;
many of the nation's Indians may fall into this category. 3 Other groups
utilize wildlife for livelihoods: trappers, guides, bounty hunters, wildlife
biologists, and commercial fishermen all depend on the wildlife resource
for their daily bread. Large numbers of administrators, wardens, and biol-
ogists are intimately concerned with wildlife regulation. Behind the indi-
viduals affected stand many institutions that are intimately bound up in
1. See generally WILDLIFEAND AMERICA (H. Brokaw ed. 1979).
2. It is reasonably clear that neither sport hunting nor fishing is a "right," the full exercise of
which is constitutionally protected, but it is an important "privilege" nonetheless. Baldwin v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
3. E.g., Hobbs, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights, 32 GEo WASH L. Rev 504, 507 (1964). If
tribes are beneficiaries of a treaty, their interest qualifies as a "right" not subject to state defeasance,
e.g., Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (Puyallup I), but this prob-
ably is vulnerable to federal restriction. Coggins & Modrcin, Native American Indians and Federal
Wildlife Law, 31 STAN. L. REv 375 (1979). But see United States v. Cutler, 37 F. Supp. 724 (E.D.
Idaho 1941).
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wildlife exploitation and thus are particularly vulnerable to stringent
regulation. Without furs, furriers go bankrupt. Without live targets, the
arms and ammunition industry will see a severe decline in sales. Much of
the pet trade is in wild species. Zoos, roadside wildlife attractions, and
marine worlds are dependent upon the availability of live specimens. 4
Animals or their carcasses are also important for medical and biological
research. A wide variety of dealers, importers, exporters, catchers, and
poachers service these demands. 5 In addition, an unknown number of pri-
vate organizations, which range from the National Rifle Association to
the National Wildlife Federation to the Fund for Animals, are devoted to
some aspect of wildlife welfare. Courts and legislatures frequently have
turned receptive ears to their interests. All of the foregoing groups and
individuals have demonstrated a willingness to litigate questions of wild-
life management. To each, the validity of federal law and its effect upon
state regulation is frequently crucial.
The United States Supreme Court decided eight cases in the past three
years that directly involve wildlife protection or regulation. 6 Other deci-
sions by the Court have important implications for wildlife management. 7
More cases of both types likely will be considered by the Supreme Court
in the near future. In general, the cases have arisen under federal law,
under Indian treaties, and under state law. Most of the decisions were di-
rectly premised upon provisions of the United States Constitution; others
had constitutional overtones.
The cases arising under federal laws include Cappaert v. United
States,8 where the Court ruled that the implied federal reservation of suf-
ficient groundwater to preserve the Devil's Hole Pupfish overrode the
state-granted right of adjacent landowners to pump water from the com-
mon aquifer.9 The 1976 opinion in Kleppe v. New Mexico 10 was a ringing
affirmation of federal power to regulate and protect wildlife on federal
4. See Rosin, Federal Regulations of Zoos, 5 ENVTL AFF. 381 (1976).
5. See generally WILDLIFE AND AMERICA. supra note 1.
6. Washington v. Washington State Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 99 S.Ct. 3055
(1979); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696
(1978); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978);
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (Puyallup III); Douglas v.
Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
7. E.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978). See note 9 infra.
8. 426U.S. 128 (1976).
9. However, in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), the Court, in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, refused to find that the reservation of a national forest also implied reservation
of sufficient water to protect and nurture the wildlife and fish within the forest. A biting dissent
argued that in 1897 Congress possessed a broader view of the nature of a forest than the majority
assumed. Neither opinion questioned Congress' constitutional power to override state interests by
prior implied reservation.
10. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
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lands, even in contravention of state law. However, it left open several
questions necessary for delineating the ultimate limits of federal control
over wildlife."I The hitherto unknown and insignificant Snail Darter, an
endangered species of small perch, made a big splash in the highly-publi-
cized Tellico Dam case, 12 but no party to that litigation challenged the
constitutionality of the section of the Endangered Species Act at issue. 13
On February 27, 1979, the Court noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal
in Allard v. Andrus, 14 a three-judge panel decision invalidating under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments federal regulations governing possession
and sale of bird artifacts legally acquired. 15
The asserted supremacy of federal Indian treaty rights over attempted
state limitations on Indian hunting and fishing practices has been a source
of increasing litigation between Indian tribes and state governments, with
federal agencies acting both as mediators and as trustees for the Indians'
interests. In 1977, in the third Puyallup decision, 16 the Supreme Court
held for the first time that states could regulate fishing by treaty Indians
on the reservation if necessary for the preservation of a fish run. 17 In an-
other case arising out of the intractable controversies over allocation of
anadromous fish resources in the Northwest,' 8 the Court two years later
held that a federal district court was empowered to act as a regional
fishmaster, and to override state law and practice in order to implement
the Indian treaties as interpreted. 19 Yet another lawsuit, an original action
brought by the State of Idaho against downstream states concerning the
same general problem, is also pending. 20 The unprecedented volume of
recent litigation challenging the power of states to regulate the taking and
selling of valuable species by Indians and their licensees, together with
1I. Kleppe is discussed in more detail at notes 171-75 and accompanying text infra.
12. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
13. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 892 (current version at
16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)).
14. 440 U.S. 905 (1979).
15. The unreported lower court opinion and other cases involving similar questions are discussed
in Part IV-B infra.
16. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (Puyallup I1). See Part V-B
infra. The earlier decisions in the same litigation are Washington Dep't of Game v. Puyallup Tribe,
414 U.S. 44 (1973) (Puyallup II), and Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 392
(1968) (Puyallup I).
17. Indian treaty and federal law preemption of state jurisdiction over Indian reservations and
off-reservation practices is discussed in Part V-B infra.
18. Washington v. Washington State Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 99 S. Ct. 3055
(1979).
19. The case grew out of and affirmed the major conclusions of the Boldt decision, United States
v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), affd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). See Part V-B infra.
20. Idaho ex rel. Andrus v. Oregon, 429 U.S. 163 (1976).
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the difficulty of the issues not yet resolved, 21 indicates that preemption
issues in this area will be brought to the Supreme Court even more fre-
quently.
The constitutional validity of state rules governing wildlife exploitation
has been litigated for well over a century, 22 but few hard-and-fast rules
have emerged. In three recent cases concerning the power of states over
wildlife regulation, the Court upheld Montana's severe discrimination
again nonresidents in fees for hunting licenses,23 threw out Virginia's
statutes denying fishing licenses to aliens and restricting fishing rights of
other nonresidents, 24 and overruled the venerable case of Geer v. Con-
necticut25 while invalidating an Oklahoma law prohibiting the exportation
of certain minnows. 26 Conflict with the commerce clause-not litigated
in the first case-was the basis for decision in the latter two cases, while
claims that the Montana law violated equal protection and privileges and
immunities guarantees were rejected in the former.
Lower federal courts as well have faced a variety of questions concern-
ing wildlife regulation, including the key issue of the constitutionality of
recent federal statutes. The increase in federal litigation is due largely to
the proliferation of federal statutes directed at wildlife protection, propa-
gation, and management. 27 The constitutionality of most federal wildlife
laws has been challenged in court: the Wild and Free-Roaming Horses
and Burros Act of 1971 (WF-RHBA)28 was upheld as it applied upon fed-
eral lands, 29 but challenges to its other applications are likely. 30 Although
the Supreme Court in 192031 upheld the general constitutionality of the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (MBTA),32 litigants continue to assert
the invalidity of some aspects of regulation under the Act. In addition to
the Allard case, 33 certain MBTA "baiting" regulations have been
21. E.g., compare the cases cited at notes 61-62. See generally Coggins & Modrcin, supra note
3.
22. E.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 234 (1842).
23. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978). See notes 198-201 and accompa-
nying text infra.
24. Douglas v. Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977). See notes 194-97 and accompanying
text infra.
25. 161 U.S. 519(1896).
26. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). See notes 202-11 and accompanying text infra.
27. See generally M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (1977); Coggins, Federal
Wildlife Law Achieves Adolescence: Developments in the 1970's. 1978 DUKE L.J. 753 [hereinafter
cited as Developments].
28. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1976).
29. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
30. See Part III-B infra.
31. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
32. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1976).
33. Allard v. Andrus, Civ. No. 75-V-1000 (D. Colo., filed June 7, 1976), rev'd, 48 U.S.L.W.
4013 (Nov. 27, 1979). Plaintiffs in Allard originally sought invalidation of both the MBTA and the
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challenged, unsuccessfully, as unconstitutionally vague. 34 Some courts
have invited constitutional challenge by creating an open-ended criminal
liability for negligent actions and accidents resulting in bird mortality. 35
The Justice Department, allegedly, 36 has been loathe to press prosecu-
tions under the Bald Eagle Act 37 for fear that it is invalid. The Montana
federal district court recently threw out the entire federal Airborne Hunt-
ing Act 38 as a contravention of the tenth amendment, 39 but the Nebraska
federal district court upheld the Act as a valid exercise of the commerce
power shortly thereafter. 40 Two plaintiffs sought to invalidate the Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), 41 but their allegations that
certain MMPA standards are irrational were rejected by the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 Cases raising other constitu-
tional issues under the MMPA are pending. 43 The Endangered Species
Act of 1973 (ESA)44 has been attacked in a variety of circumstances but
has remained intact to date. Courts have rejected constitutional arguments
against the assertion of federal power when federal law dictated state
wildlife management actions, 45 and again when a federal agency confis-
cated a valuable inventory of legally acquired products made from an en-
dangered species.46 The case of a farmer allegedly beset by depredating
but protected wolves is pending. 47 The general validity of these primary
federal wildlife "species" statutes is the key inquiry. If they are constitu-
Bald Eagle Act, but later dropped those contentions. See notes 380-97 and accompanying text infra.
34. United States v. Delahoussaye, 573 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Jarman, 491
F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Atkinson, 468 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Wis. 1979). See Part
IV-C infra.
35. United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Corbin Farm
Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal.), affd in part, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978). See Part IV-C
infra.
36. Soper, The Constitutional Framework of Environmental Law, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 34-35 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1976).
38. 16U.S.C. §742j-1 (1976).
39. United States v. Helsey, 463 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Mont.), rev'd, No. 79-1100 slip. op. at 745
(9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1979).
40. United States v. Bair, 9 ELR 20324 (D. Neb. 1979).
41. 16U.S.C. 9 1361-1407 (1976).
42. Globe Fur Dyeing Corp. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 177 (D.D.C. 1978).
43. Motor Vessels Theresa Ann v. Richardson, Civ. No. 76-963-E (S.D. Cal., filed Oct. 9,
1976); Motor Vessels Theresa Ann v. Richardson, 9 ERC 1726 (S.D. Cal.), injunction stayed, 9
ERC 2072 (9th Cir. 1977); American Tunaboat Ass'n v. Richardson, Civ. No. 76-971-E (S.D.
Cal., filed Oct. 9, 1976). See notes 304-14 and accompanying text infra.
44. 16 U.S.C. 99 1531-1543 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978).
45. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979).
See notes 318-28 and accompanying text infra.
46. Delbay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, 409 F. Supp. 637 (D.D.C.
1976). See Part IV-B infra.
47. Brzoznowski v. Secretary, Civ. 5-77-19 (D. Minn., filed Feb. 1977).
300
Vol. 55:295, 1980
Wildlife and the Constitution
tional, considerable state regulation will be preempted, and the revolution
in wildlife law will be affirmed.
Federal court cases considering international problems of domestic
wildlife regulation have grappled with constitutional issues only peripher-
ally. The Fifth Circuit has opined that principles of international comity
require a restrictive interpretation of the extraterritorial scope of the
MMPA. The court conceded that Congress constitutionally could forbid
certain conduct in foreign territory, 48 but held that Congress did not in-
tend to do SO: 49 Alaskan Natives were unsuccessful in their assertion that
the United States could not accede to an international arrangement depriv-
ing them of their right or interest in taking bowhead whales. 50 In a similar
case, the federal district court of Alaska ruled that such questions are
"political," thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. 51
Domestic adjudication of the compatibility of seal harvesting practices in
South Africa with domestic law gave rise to significant dicta on "case or
controversy" standing questions in wildlife litigation. 52 And judicial
evaluation of the purpose of Fijian statutes incorporated into federal law
gave constitutional sanction to the assimilation of foreign law. 53
The growth of federal law has created various conflicts with state laws
and with many state philosophies and attitudes. Thus, the preemption
doctrine under the supremacy clause has become increasingly important
in matters of wildlife regulation. Two federal district courts held that new
federal wildlife statutes in their application to commerce preempt more
restrictive state legislation. 54 The Second Circuit55 and New York state
courts56 had previously ruled otherwise in analogous circumstances. Less
restrictive state regulation on federal 57 and state58 lands has been struck
48. United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1001 (5th Cir. 1977).
49. The decision is analyzed in Developments, supra note 27, at 797-800; Note, Extraterritorial
Application of Federal Wildlife Statutes: A New Rule of Statutory Construction, 12 CORNELL INr'L
L.J. 143 (1979).
50. Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
51. Hopson v. Kreps, 462 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Alas. 1979). Cf. Diggs. v. Richardson, 555 F.2d
848 (D.C. Cir. 1976). But cf. United States v. Decker, 600 F.2d 733,738 n.8 (9th Cir. 1979).
52. Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1013 (1978).
53. United States v. Molt, 452 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Pa. 1978), rev'd in part, 599 F.2d 1217 (3d
Cir. 1979). See Part IV-A infra.
54. Fouke Co. v. Brown, 463 F. Supp. 1142 (E.D. Cal. 1979); Fouke Co. v. Mandel, 386 F.
Supp. 1341 (D. Md. 1974). See Part V-A infra,
55. Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aft'd, 440 F.2d 1319 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 983 (1972).
56. A.E. Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182, 264 N.E.2d 118, 315 N.Y.S.2d 625
(1970), appeal denied, 401 U.S. 969 (1971).
57. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
58. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979).
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down as well. Other courts are split over the preeminence of other federal
statutes on other federal lands. 59 Many preemption cases involve at-
tempted state wildlife regulation on Indian reservations or of tribal mem-
bers who are treaty beneficiaries, and implicate longstanding controver-
sies over jurisdiction among Indian tribes, state governments, and the
federal government. Eskimos have been successful in initially preventing
transfer of marine mammal regulatory jurisdiction to the State of
Alaska, 6° and several tribes have been able to exclude all state wildlife
regulation from their reservation, 61 although others have not. 62 These in-
stances may be but harbingers of a future flood of litigation.
All of these cases, save the Supreme Court's assessment of the consti-
tutional validity of state wildlife laws, represent fairly novel develop-
ments, for wildlife regulation has been only occasionally a legal matter
for most of the Nation's history. 63 Wildlife is not mentioned in the Con-
stitution, and seldom have litigants seen fit to pose constitutional
problems in controversies over wildlife taking, protection, or manage-
ment.
Wildlife law, moreover, is complicated by a long history of concep-
tualization and indifference. After a century of relative disinclination to
consider wildlife preservation, states gradually enacted hunting codes and
other means of ensuring an abundance of game. 64 Until recently, states
have been conceded a nearly exclusive monopoly on wildlife regulation,
a profitable prerogative which is cherished and adamantly defended. 65
The steady-and sometimes spectacular-erosion of state regulatory
preeminence raises the problem of the proper jurisdictional allocation be-
59. Compare Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 9 ERC 2111 (D.D.C. 1977) (Alaska Wolf II)
with Alaska v. Andrus, 591 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1979) (Alaska Wolf III).
60. Togiak v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 423 (D.D.C. 1979).
61. E.g., Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 588
F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978).
62. United States v. Montana, 598 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1979) (this opinion was published at this
citation in the advance sheets, but was withdrawn from the bound volume by order of the court. See
id. at n. 1). Even federal jurisdiction over Indian hunting has been denied on occasion. See Coggins &
Modrcin, supra note 3.
63. The law has long been concerned with notions of property and tort as they relate to animals
ferae naturae, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), but legal problems stem-
ming from governmental efforts to promote healthy wildlife populations are a relatively recent phe-
nomenon. See Coggins & Smith, The Emerging Law of Wildlife: A Narrative Bibliography, 6 ENVTL
L. 583 (1975).
64. See generally Lund, British Wildlife Law Before the American Revolution: Lessons from the
Past, 74 MICH L. REV 49 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Lund I]; Lund, Early American Wildlife Law,
51 N.Y.U. L. REV 703 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Lund II].
65. See Coggins & Hensley, Constitutional Limits on Federal Pover to Protect and Manage
Wildlife: Is the Endangered Species Act Endangered?, 61 IowA L. REV 1099, 1150 (1976); Com-
ment, Regulation of Wildlife in the National Park System: Federal or State?, 12 NAT RESOURCES J.
627.633 (1972).
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tween states and the federal government.
The debate in legislatures, courts, agencies, and law reviews over the
constitutionality of federal wildlife regulation has been disjointed and epi-
sodic, frenetically focused on each major Supreme Court pronouncement
and then dying away until the next. 66 In fact, the major Supreme Court
opinions are generally consistent in their evaulation of federal versus state
powers over activities affecting wildlife, and federal legislation uniformly
has rejected complete preemption in favor of cooperative jurisdictional
arrangements. The debate is thus obsolete. It is time to recognize that pre-
sent federal wildlife law is constitutional, and that even if it is extended
broadly, it will remain within constitutional limits, at least in general
outline. With that premise, particular enforcement problems and future
federal-state regulatory relationships can be approached more rationally.
This article suggests the constitutionally permissible limits of federal
wildlife regulation and its preemptive effect on parallel state efforts. Part
II traces the major judicial pronouncements on the constitutionality of
state and federal wildlife law in the context of the growth of federal regu-
lation. The theme of this Part is the erosion and ultimate downfall of the
state ownership doctrine. Part III assesses the validity of the present fed-
eral wildlife statutes not yet scrutinized by the Supreme Court, and it con-
cludes that, in general, they are constitutional. Part IV discusses
miscellaneous constitutional problems that have arisen with respect to
particular severe applications of federal wildlife law. Assuming the valid-
ity of federal law, its preemptive effect and scope are assessed in Part V.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF WILDLIFE LAW
The historical development of wildlife law and regulation has been the
subject of considerable contemporary investigation. 67 This Part is limited
to a general recapitulation that emphasizes several principles and facts
relevant to present constitutional controversies. The first section traces
the rise of the notion that states "own" wildlife. The second section out-
lines the systems of federal wildlife regulation that grew up in spite of the
state ownership doctrine, and the third section follows the demise of that
doctrine.
66. The literary ebb and flow is traced in Coggins & Smith, supra note 63, at 604-06.
67. M. BEAN. supra note 27; J. TREFErHAN. AN AMERICAN CRUSADE FOR WILDLIFE (1975); Coggins
& Hensley, supra note 65; Coggins & Smith, supra note 63; Lund I & II, supra note 64.
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A. The Growth of State Wildlife Regulation
and the Ownership Doctrine
New World colonists frequently shared-and ofttimes violently as-
serted-a loathing of any restriction on their rights to bear arms and shoot
game. 68 This belief is still firmly ingrained in many Americans. Wildlife
resources are renewable, and not infinite, as many have supposed. 69 Con-
sequently, almost from the beginning of settlement on this continent,
organized society has deemed some regulation necessary for the preserva-
tion of wildlife breeding stock.70 The early ordinances of colonies, states,
and localities were mostly hortatory, however, and their beneficial effect
was limited to voluntary compliance by the populace. 7' Popular attitudes
doomed early game conservation measures, and legal protection of non-
game wildlife was unheard of. Game in the East declined. 72 Some species
were extirpated intentionally. 73 Solitary species retreated from civiliza-
tion and market gunning was common. 74 Many forms of wildlife were
virtually exterminated from the frontier even before the first permanent
settlers arrived. Mountain men brought the beaver to near-extinction in
the Rockies. The progress of railroads meant the demise of the bison, and
game was reduced to historically low levels by the turn of the century.
The glimmerings of new regulatory systems founded on a new attitude
or ethic can be perceived as early as the exploitive Gilded Age. 75 The
keys to modern wildlife management were the reinvention of the game
warden in the latter 19th century, 76 and a shift in public opinion that led to
a new legal regime under law. Except for isolated federal legislation con-
cerning wildlife exploitation in the territories, 77 nineteenth century con-
68. Lund I, supra note 64, at 71.
69. W. HORNADAY. OUR VANISHING WILD LIFE. ITS EXTERMINATION AND PRESERVATION (1913). quotes
an Ohio legislator speaking in 1857 against a bill to protect the "wonderfully prolific" passenger
pigeon: "'No ordinary destruction can lessen them, or be missed from the myriads that are yearly
produced." The last passenger pigeon expired in a zoo the year after Hornaday's book appeared.
70. See generally D. ALLEN. OUR WILDLIFE LEGACY (rev. ed. 1962); 1. GABRIELSON. WILDLIFE
MANAGEMENT (1951); P. MATTHIESSEN. WILDLIFE IN AMERICA (1959); J. TREFETHAN, supra note 67.
71. Lund II, supra note 64, at 722-25.
72. Early 19th century efforts to preserve the heath hen failed and the bird became extinct See J.
TREFETHAN. supra note 67, at 210-12.
73. Wolves and other predators from time immemorial have been killed whenever and however
possible. Bounty laws were among the first Colonial legislative efforts. See, e.g.. D. ALLEN. supra
note 70, at 258-76. See generally Comment, Predator Control and the Federal Government. 51
N.D. L. REv 787 (1975).
74. See generally P. MATTHIESSEN. supra note 70, passim; J. TREFETHAN. supra note 67, passim.
75. See G. MARSH. MAN AND NATURE (1864).
76. J. TREFETHAN. supra note 67, at 109, 112-13. "Wardens" were, of course, common in medi-
eval England.
77. See, e.g., North Am. Comm'l Co. v. United States, 171 U.S. 110(1898), and The James G.
Swan, 50 F. 108 (D. Wash. 1892) for a discussion of the legislation.
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straints on taking wildlife were creatures of state law. State legislation
was directed at preservation of a food source; neither recreational, ethi-
cal, nor aesthetic values were prominent in legislation until well into this
century.
The legal foundation for state regulation was laid in a sporadic series of
United States Supreme Court decisions that culminated in the rule that
wildlife is owned by the several states in trust for the people. Under this
rule, a state can impose whatever regulation it deems necessary to
preserve the common resource. In Roman law, animals ferae naturae
were deemed res nullius, the property of no one (like air or water) until
reduced to possession.78 The English system was far more complex and
restrictive: "Stripped of its many formalities, the essential core of En-
glish wildlife law on the eve of the American Revolution was the com-
plete authority of the King and the Parliament to determine what rights
others might have with respect to the taking of wildlife." 79 The American
colonists rejected the class-based English restrictions on arms and hunt-
ing,80 but the states fell heir to the sovereign regulatory power. In 1842
the Supreme Court held that "the powers of sovereignty, [and) the
prerogatives and regalities" 81 of the English Crown concerning wildlife
had become vested in the states, "subject only to the rights since surren-
dered by the constitution to the general government.' '82 From that edifice
was constructed the state ownership doctrine. In a series of shellfish
cases, the Supreme Court in the next fifty years held that Maryland could
forbid certain methods of taking oysters;83 that Virginia could prohibit
residents of other states from planting or taking oysters in its tidewaters; 84
and that Massachusetts could prohibit the use of purse seines for catching
menhaden in Buzzard's Bay. 85 The key decision in this doctrinal develop-
ment was the 1896 case of Geer v. Connecticut.86 In Geer, the Court
upheld the conviction of one possessing legally taken game with intent to
78. See S. Ahtos. THE HISTORYAND PRINCIPLES OFTHECIVIL LAWOF RoMiE 160-61 (1883); M. BEAN.
supra note 27, at 8.
79. M. BEAN. supra note 27, at 12. See generally J. CHtrr. A TREATISEONTHEGAME LAW AND ON
FISHERIES (1812); W. NELSON.THE LAWS OF ENGLAND CONCERNING GAME.OF HUNTING, HAWKING. FISHING.
AND FOWLING (2d ed. 1732).
80. Lund II, supra note 64, at 715.
81. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 234,267 (1842).
82. Id. at 263. See M. BEAN, supra note 27, at 12-14; MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in
the Civil and Common Law: Historical Development. Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That
Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 511, 554-55 (1975). See also Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
83. Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855).
84. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877).
85. Manchesterv. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891).
86. 161 U.S. 519(1896).
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export it from the state. After an extensive discourse on the ancient law of
animals, 87 the Geer Court held that the Connecticut law was not a burden
on interstate commerce because the state owned the game, it had a duty to
preserve it, and "thus" could prevent it from entering interstate com-
merce.
88
These cases in the aggregate, but especially Geer, gave rise to the
widespread, frequently ardent belief that because a state owned its resi-
dent wildlife, its actions with respect to its property were subject to no
constraints, not even to constitutional restrictions, and that the federal
government was "correspondingly" powerless to regulate wildlife at
all. 89 This belief, still prevalent in some quarters, never had a firm consti-
tutional foundation. None of the nineteenth century cases involved con-
flicting federal regulation. Each of the cases relied on by states' rights
advocates posed only the question whether a particular state law burdened
interstate commerce or invidiously discriminated against nonresidents.
In each case, the Court significantly qualified its language. In Martin v.
Waddell,90 Chief Justice Taney noted that states' powers over "the pub-
lic common of piscary" 91 were subject to paramount federal powers
,which Taney did not essay to define. 92 The Court in the Maryland oyster
case listed a series of open questions, including several involving federal
powers. 93 The Massachusetts menhaden decision reserved the question of
congressional power to control fishery.94 The Virginia oyster decision
simply affirmed state ownership. 95 The Geer Court, however, expressly
limited its holdings on the powers of states with the caveat that the state
power extended only "in so far as its exercise may not be incompatible
with, or restrained by, the rights conveyed to the Federal government by
the Constitution." 96
87. Id. at 522-29.
88. Id. at 530-34.
89. Cf. Corwin. Game Proteciion and the Constitution. 14 Mich. L. Rev. 613 (1916).
90. 41 U.S.(16Pet.)234(1842).
91. Id. at 264.
92. Id. at 263.
93. In Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855), the Court stated:
Whether [the liberty of taking oysters from Maryland waters] belongs exclusively to the citizens
of the State of Maryland, or may lawfully be enjoyed in common by all citizens of the United
States; whether this public use may be restricted by the state to its own citizens, or a part of
them, or by force of the Constitution of the United States, must remain common to all citizens of
the United States; whether the national government, by a Treaty or Act of Congress, can grant to
foreigners the right to participate therein; or what, in general, are the limits of the trust upon
which the State holds this soil, or its power to define or control that trust, are matters wholly
without the scope of this case, and upon which we give no opinion.
Id. at 75.
94. Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240. 266( 1891).
95. McCready v. Virginia. 94 U.S. 391. 394-95 (1876).
96. 161 U.S. at 528.
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The qualifying language in Geer was universally ignored, however,
most notably by the Supreme Court itself in an eminently forgettable
1912 opinion, The Abby Dodge.97 The United States sought forfeiture of
a vessel used for taking sponges by means which violated a federal statute
applicable to the Gulf of Mexico. The record did not specify whether the
sponges had been taken within or without the assumed three-mile limit of
state jurisdiction, but appellant argued that the federal statute was beyond
the power of Congress whether or not it was intended to apply within the
limit of "state" waters. 98 The United States did not claim that the Act
was binding within state borders. Rather, it asserted that the United States
had jurisdiction over foreign commerce and over actions beyond three
miles, and that it had not been shown that any of the sponges had been
taken within the boundaries of the state. 99 Chief Justice White, also the
author of Geer, held that the Act applied only beyond state waters and
remanded for a determination of the place of taking. 100
This case is the first known instance of an asserted conflict between
federal wildlife regulation and state power over wildlife. It has been cited
for the proposition that "state ownership of wildlife is complete and pre-
cludes federal wildlife regulation." 101 The holding, however, does not go
that far. The Court stated preliminarily that the act would be unconstitu-
tional if it applied within state boundaries, 102 but went on to hold that the
Act only applied beyond the three-mile limit, thereby avoiding a direct
resolution of the constitutional question. 103 Thus the Court's statement-
that if the Act applied within states, "the repugnancy of the act to the
Constitution would plainly be established by the decisions of this
court" '04 -is not only a flawed reading of those prior cases, but also is
merely a dictum. In other words, the only holding in the case is that the
statute only applied extraterritorially and, as such, was a permissible ex-
ercise of federal power over foreign commerce.
In any event, The Abby Dodge lost all precedential value almost imme-
diately, and even as misconstrued, is widely regarded as an aberration in
the law, one overturned sub silentio many times over. 105 The reach of the
commerce clause has been broadened greatly since 1912,106 the owner-
97. 223U.S. 166(1912).
98. Id. at 167-68.
99. Id. at 170.
100. Id. at 177-78.
101. Lundberg, Birds, Bunnies and the Furbish Louseivort-Wildlife and Mining on the Public
Lands, 24 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST: 93, 96 (1978).
102. 223U.S. at 173.
103. Id. at 173-76.
104. Id. at 173.
105. See M. BEAN, supra note 27, at 33; notes 162-86 and accompanying text infra.
106. D. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: FEDERAL AND STATE 85-100 (1974); Coggins & Hens-
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ship theory has been discarded, 10 7 and subsequent federal wildlife
legislation uniformly has been upheld in the face of actual conflicts with
state regulation. 108
The early cases thus did not establish much by way of enduring consti-
tutional principles. Severe state fisheries regulation was upheld in four
notable instances, but the challenges to them were based on the com-
merce and privileges and immunities provisions of the Constitution. No
conflict with federal regulation existed, even in the case of The Abbv
Dodge. The most that could be said was that states, by virtue of their sov-
ereignty, had wide powers over human activities impinging on wildlife
because the state owned the wildlife in trust for the people. The state
ownership was always subject, however, to an undefined paramount fed-
eral power'0 9 that was not exercised significantly until this century.
B. The Growth of Federal Wildlife Law
Because the evolution of federal wildlife law has been recounted in de-
tail elsewhere, 10 this section will merely trace its broad outlines and
sketch in the high points. Federal jurisdiction over marine fisheries and
other marine resources beyond the assumed three-mile limit has generally
been conceded, and the federal government's involvement with regula-
tion of marine wildlife is long-standing and still growing rapidly. "' The
federal laws outlawing hunting in national parks originated in 1894,'12
and have never been challenged successfully. 113 By the Lacey Act of
1900,'1 4 the federal government made its cautious entry into standard
wildlife management. The Act outlawed interstate commerce in fish and
game taken illegally in the state of origin." 5 It thus served as a backstop
for state efforts to preserve and manage resident wildlife, and as such was
ley, supra note 65, at 1130-32; Part IV-B infra.
107. See 11-C infra.
108. See notes 164-75 and accompanying text infra.
109. See notes 90-96 and accompanying text supra.
110. M. BEAN. supra note 27; Developments, supra note 27: Lundberg, supra note 101.
Ill. See, e.g., Coggins, Legal Protection for Marine Mammals: An Overview of lnnovative Re-
source Conservation Legislation, 6 ENVT'L L. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Marine Mammals]. Fed-
eral jurisdiction over marine fisheries management was greatly expanded by passage of the Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801 -1882 (Supp. 1977).
112. Act of May 7, 1894, ch. 72, 28 Stat. 73 (1894).
113. Cf. New Mexico State Game Comm'n v. Udall, 410 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 396 U.S. 961 (1970). See M. BEAN. supra note 27, at 26.
114. Ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (1900). The current version of the Lacey Act, as amended and
expanded over the years, is codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 667e, 701 (1976), and at 18 U.S.C. §§ 42-44
(1976).
115. See M. BEA .supra note 27, at 108-15.
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upheld as a valid exercise of the commerce power. "16
From those modest beginnings, Congress, again and again over the
decades, has mandated an active-if not intrusive-role for federal agen-
cies in wildlife management. The federal wildlife statutes can be grouped
roughly into those that govern public land management,"i7 those that pro-
vide for financing of and federal cooperation with state fish and game
agencies,I 18 those that require consideration of wildlife values in all fed-
eral decisionmaking, 119 those that regulate commerce in wildlife and
116. Rupert v. United States, 181 F. 87 (8th Cir. 1910); Eager v. Jonesboro, Lake City & E.
Express Co., 103 Ark. 288, 147 S.W. 60 (1912).
117. Federal-state relationships are especially delicate in the matter of wildlife management on
federal public lands. The federal government owns about one-third of the national land mass and
divides it into five main systems for management. Excluding lands owned by the Post Office, the
Defense Department, TVA, and other miscellaneous agencies, the bulk of the federal lands are in the
Wilderness System, the National Park System, the National Forest System, the National Resources
Lands System, and the National Wildlife Refuge System.
Whatever doubts there may have been about federal power to protect and manage wildlife on fed-
eral lands were removed by Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). Even so, Congress has
trodden very cautiously in this emotion-laden area. The Sikes Act Extension, 16 U.S.C. §§ 670g-
670h(c) (1976), requires a wildlife planning process for the federal public lands that will rely heavily
on state cooperation and direction. Except for many units of the National Park System, in which no
hunting is allowed, the organic legislation for the other systems specifies in each case that game
regulation shall be pursuant to state law. E.g., National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act
of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(c) (1976). And in each case there is a reservoir of overriding discretion
in the federal land manager of yet undetermined extent. Id. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 9
ERC 2111 (D.D.C. 1977) (Alaska Wolf 11); Part V-C infra. Federal and state agencies have worked
out informally agreements limiting the federal role to habitat enhancement while states control the
wildlife taking. See Gottshalk, The State-Federal Partnership in Wildlife Conservation, in WILDLIFE
AND AMERICA, supra note 1, at 290, 291. Whether this agreement can survive in the face of arguably
contrary federal statutes is uncertain.
118. Legislation since the mid-1930's has provided federal monies for state fish and game pro-
grams. The oldest and most successful is the Pittman-Robertson program whereby special taxes on
guns and other sporting equipment are placed in a special fund for distribution to state agencies.
Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 669-669i (1976). With the $687 million in
receipts since 1937, states have acquired thousands of acres of wildlife habitat and conducted numer-
ous other projects and programs. Gottshalk, supra note 117, at 297. The Dingell-Johnson bill does
essentially the same thing for inland fish. Federal Aid in Fish Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
777-777k (1976). The Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1964, U.S.C. §§ 4601-4 to
4601-11(1976), provides considerable supplementary funds to states for further habitat and recrea-
tional land acquisition. See Futrell, Parks to the People: New Directions for the National Park Ser-
vice, 25 EMORY L.J. 255 (1976). Cost of other wildlife programs, such as predator control, are borne
directly by the federal government. See Comment, supra note 73.
The mild irony in this system is that the state agencies resentful of any federal interference are
subsidized to the point of dire dependence upon federal largess. Further, the only other assured
source of state agency funds is a result of the most intrusive, yet unchallenged, federal statute: under
Pittman-Robertson, state agencies are eligible for federal funds only if they are entitled by law to use
all fishing and hunting license fees. 16 U.S.C. § 669 (1976). Thus, federal law not only has dictated
state taxation policy, it has also contributed to the prevalent game production orientation of state
managers by making them dependent upon license revenues from those they regulate.
119. Several statutes require federal agencies to take wildlife values into consideration in the
planning of public and some private projects. The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958, 16
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wildlife products, 1 20 and those that require direct protection and manage-
ment of designated species. The categories are by no means exclusive:
many statutes have two, three or even four of the attributes listed. Fur-
ther, the federal statutes are not all-encompassing nor entirely consistent,
clear, or coherent.12 1 It is probable that the evolution of federal wildlife
law has not come to an end. 122
Out of the current array of federal wildlife law, the area involving the
greatest constitutional controversy is direct species protection. The Mi-
gratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (MBTA), 123 premised on an international
agreement after an earlier federal act had been invalidated by several
lower courts, 124 grants the Secretary of the Interior vast discretion over all
native migratory birds. All persons are forbidden to take any such bird
"by any means in any manner" unless it is done pursuant to federal per-
mit or regulation. 125 After the Supreme Court upheld the MBTA under
the treaty power, 126 a cooperative system grew up whereby the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service, acting upon the advice of state agencies
and regional councils, sets overall hunting guidelines and regulations
which are then enforced primarily by the states. 127 The bald eagle was
granted special protected status in 1940, for Congress foresaw the extinc-
tion of the national symbol if action were not taken. 128
U.S.C. §§ 661-667e (1976), for example, requires consideration of wildlife mitigation measures in
the development of water resource projects. The water development agency must also apply that stan-
dard in licensing private projects that alter or affect navigable waters. See Parenteau, Unfulfilled Miti-
gation Requirements of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 42 TRANS. N. Ai. WILDLIFE & NAT.
RFs. CONF. 179 (1977). Overriding all narrower consideration-type statutes is the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976), which, while not mentioning wildlife,
has had an enormous effect upon wildlife management. See, e.g., Minnesota PIRG v. Butz. 541 F.2d
1292 (8th Cir.), stay denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976); Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 9 ERC 2111
(D.D.C. 1977) (Alaska Wolf II). NEPA requires a determination of the adverse effects upon wildlife.
inter alia, before any major federal action, including the licensing of private actions, can proceed.
120. All of the species statutes discussed below regulate commerce in the designated species.
The Lacey Act of 1900, 16 U.S.C. §§ 667e, 701, 18 U.S.C. §§ 42-44 (1976), operates solely
against interstate and foreign commerce and importation.
121. Bean, Federal Wildlife Law, in WILDLIFEAND AMERICA, supra note 1, at 279.
122. For example, now pending is a treaty draft by the Federal Republic of Germany for a Con-
vention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals which, if agreed to, ratified, and
implemented, would extend federal management and protection to all members of any species which
cross international boundaries. Second Revised Draft Convention on the Conservation of Migratory
Species of Wild Animals with Explanatory Notes, Dec. 1978, Germany. If enacted into domestic
law, this extension of coverage would revolutionize federal wildlife law once again.
123. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1976).
124. United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915); United States v. Shauver, 214 F.
154 (E.D. Ark. 1914), appeal dismissed, 248 U.S. 594 (1919).
125. 16U.S.C. §§703,704(1976).
126. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
127. See Coggins & Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50
COLO. L. REV. 165 (1979).
128. Bald Eagle Protection Act of 1940, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1976). The Bald
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Following the 1940 Bald Eagle Act, direct federal species protection
lay dormant for a generation. Dormancy ended with a spate of congres-
sional activity in the early 1970's which nearly reversed traditional wild-
life management presumptions as to the federally designated species.
Under the ceaseless prodding of Wild Horse Annie Johnston, 129 Congress
responded to the decline in herds of feral ungulates by passing the Air-
borne Hunting Act, 130 and then by enacting the Wild Free-Roaming
Horses and Burros Act of 1971 (WF-RHBA). 131 The WF-RHBA decreed
an end to all private killing of the animals and outlawed all commerce in
carcasses. 132 Although the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest
Service are allowed to remove some beasts, management is to be at the
"minimal feasible level."1 33 The constitutionality of WF-RHBA as ap-
plied to federal lands was upheld in 1976,134 but other questions of its
applicability remain unresolved. 135
The Marine Mammals Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), 136 covers an
entire group of species-from sea otters to whales, and from dugongs to
polar bears-and forbids their killing or sale except in defined circum-
stances or under express federal permission. 137 The MMPA affects inter-
national trade and international wildlife management practices, and
severely restricts state management jurisdiction over coastal marine mam-
mals. 138 Lawsuits asserting its invalidity-on somewhat shaky grounds-
have not been successful. 139
Federal protection of species deemed "endangered" (and, more re-
cently, "threatened") dates from 1966. A simple hortatory statute of that
year, 140 was strengthened by a 1969 amendment establishing a process
Eagle Act was less than a screaming success: the species was listed as endangered in 1978. 43 Fed.
Reg. 6,230-33 (1978).
129. See Johnston, The Fight to Save a Memory, 50 TEx. L. REv. 1055 (1972).
130. 18 U.S.C. § 47 (1976).
131. Pub. L. No. 92-195, 85 Stat. 649 (1971) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(1976)).
132. Id. § 1333.
133. Id. § 1333(a).
134. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
135. See note 242 and accompanying text infra.
136. Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407
(1976)).
137. See generally M. BEAN, supra note 27, at ch. 1; Marine Mammals, supra note I 11.
138. 16U.S.C. §§ 1371(a), 1378, 1379(a) (1976). See M. BEAN, supra note27, at 326-28.
139. See cases cited in notes 42-43 supra.
140. Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669r §§ 1-3, 80 Stat. 926
(1966) (repealed 1973). The Act directed the Secretary of the Interior to "carry out a program in the
United States of conserving, protecting, restoring, and propagating" native fish and wildlife species
"threatened with extinction," id. at § 2(a), and to review other programs under his authority, with a
view toward utilizing them, "to the extent practicable," for furthering the purposes of the preserva-
tion program. Id. at § 2(d).
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for administrative listing of species in dire trouble and authorizing impor-
tation controls and a few other limitations on trade in listed species.
14
Dissatisfied by the administrative timidity and lack of results produced
under the 1969 amendment, and alarmed by perceived crises in extinction
rates, 142 Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ES A). ' 43
The Act recites the treaty power as authority for the furthest ranging,
most drastic wildlife protection legislation ever enacted. 144 Every species
of fauna or flora in the world that is or may become in danger of extinc-
tion is eligible for listing,145 even if the population depletion is only in a
"significant portion of its range."' 146 Virtually all taking of and com-
merce in endangered wildlife species is prohibited, 147 and the Secretary
of the Interior is given broad discretion over the protection of plants and
threatened wildlife species. 148 Federal agencies are both forbidden to con-
tribute to extinction and also enjoined to devote their efforts to
preservation and propagation. ' 49 But the 1973 ESA is not limited to fed-
eral agencies or federal lands: all persons in any area are absolutely for-
bidden to harm or sell listed species. 150 As the most far-reaching federal
wildlife statute, the Endangered Species Act is also the most vulnerable to
basic constitutional attack. ' 5' Amendments in 1978,152 in response to the
infamous Snail Darter case, watered down the Act in some respects,' 53
141. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135. 83 Stat. 275 (1969)
(repealed 1973).
142. For the legislative history of the 1973 Act, see M. Bean, supra note 27, at ch. 12; Coggins,
Conserving Wildlife Resources: An Overview of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 N.D.L.
REV. 315 (1974); Note, Obligations of Federal Agencies Under Section 7 of the Endangered Species
Act of 1973, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1247 (1976). See also TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
143. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976), as amended byv Endangered Species Act Amendments of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, §2, 92 Stat. 3571 (1978).
144. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(4) (1976).
145. Id. at §§ 1533(a)-(c). The Supreme Court in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153. 159 n.8 (1978).
quoted the director of the Endangered Species Program in the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service:
The act covers every animal and plant species, subspecies, and population in the world needing
protection. There are approximately 1.4 million full species of animals and 600,000 full species
of plants in the world. Various authorities calculate as many as 10% of them--some 200,000-
may need to be listed as Endangered or Threatened. When one counts in subspecies, not to
mention individual populations, the total could increase to three to five times that number.
146. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(4), (15) (1976). See also id. at §1533(c)(1).
147. Id. §§ 1538(a)(l)(B), (D), (E), 1539(a), (b), (e).
148. Id. § 1533(d).
149. Id. § 1536.
150. Id. §§ 1538(a), (g).
151. See Coggins & Hensley, supra note 65, at 1120-22.
152. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 4, 92 Stat. 3760
(1978).
153. See Stromberg, The Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978: A Step Backwards?, 7
B. C. ENvT'L AFF L. REV 33 (1979). The Snail Darter case is formally cited as TVA v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153 (1978).
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but did not alter its scope or nature. 154 The notorious litigation under sec-
tion 7 of the Act was not complicated by constitutional questions, but
such issues are arising under its other provisions. 155
In 1976, Congress moved to assert full control over offshore marine
fisheries by enactment of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act
(FCMA), 156 legislation faintly reminiscent of the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act. 157 In essence, the FCMA provides that fishing within 200 miles of
the terrestrial United States requires federal permission. 158 Complex
structures and management criteria are mandated, the desired results be-
ing healthier fish populations and a healthier general marine environ-
ment. 5 9 In light of the long history of federal marine fisheries regula-
tion, 16° challenges to the FCMA are more likely to be based on
international law principles than on federal constitutional provisions. 161
Federal wildlife law has grown in a rapid and disorganized manner-
there is a lot of it, but the pieces do not necessarily fit together. There are,
however, themes common to all of the species statutes: Each was enacted
to combat species population declines caused at least in part by state ina-
bility or unwillingness to act positively; each accords states some role in
implementation and enforcement; each has international ramifications;
and each represents a federal denial of the limitations asserted to be inher-
ent in Geer and The Abby Dodge.
C. Demise of the State Ownership Doctrine
Congress quickly repudiated The Abby Dodge by passing the MBTA in
1913 and again in 1918.162 Very shortly thereafter the Supreme Court
consigned the case to a richly deserved constitutional limbo. 163 Geer,
154. Section 7 was-remarkably-left intact. Congress created a cabinet-level commit-
tee to resolve conflicts between federal projects and listed species. The committee, in its first two
decisions, refused to exempt Tellico Dam (the site of the snail darter controversy) and accepted the
settlement terms of the Grayrocks Dam litigation, Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Administration,
12 ERC 1156 (D. Neb. 1978).
155. See notes 318-28 and accompanying text infra.
156. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (Supp. 1977).
157. The wide range of species covered, the statutory goals, the discretion accorded the adminis-
trator, and the federal-regional-state cooperative structures are similar.
158. 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (Supp. 1977).
159. Id. § 1853. See generally Symposium, 52 WASH. L. Rav. 427 (1977).
160. See, e.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
161. Federal power over foreign commerce and navigation, long recognized and exercised, fully
supports the FCMA.
162. Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1976).
163. The Abby Dodge virtually disappeared from judicial decisions almost immediately, and its
"federal power" dictum has never been used as controlling precedent by any other court. Dozens of
later cases have ignored or ruled contrary to it without bothering to overrule it directly.
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however, retained vitality and remained the cornerstone for the propo-
nents of states' rights in wildlife management. This section traces the
cases in which the Geer state ownership doctrine was progressively cut
back until Geer itself was overruled in 1979. Two parallel lines of cases
run throughout this period, one line evaluating federal legislation, and the
other considering state statutes. Both lines contributed to the demise of
the state ownership doctrine.
The first blow to the Geer doctrine was dealt by Justice Holmes in Mis-
souri v. Holland'64 in upholding the MBTA as a valid exercise of the
treaty power. Missouri (and Kansas as amicus curiae) claimed that the
MBTA impermissibly infringed upon powers reserved to states by the
tenth amendment. They also argued that the MBTA divested states of
their property rights in birds. Holmes retorted:
No doubt it is true that as between a State and its inhabitants the State may
regulate the killing and sale of such birds, but it does not follow that its
authority is exclusive of paramount powers. To put the claim of the State
upon title is to lean upon a slender reed. Wild birds are not in the possession
of anyone; and possession is the beginning of ownership. 165
Geer was merely mentioned and The Abby Dodge was not even cited. The
Court also took pains to indicate that cases holding the previous migratory
bird act unconstitutional were not necessarily rightly decided. 166 Later
circuit court opinions indicated that they were wrongly decided by up-
holding the MBTA under the commerce clause. 167
Federal power was upheld again in 1928, in Hunt v. United States. 168
The Supreme Court summarily dismissed state objections to the killing of
excess deer by the Forest Service without compliance with state law. 169
Lower courts also extended that holding. 170
The only other state challenge to federal wildlife regulation to reach the
Supreme Court was Kleppe v. New Mexico' 7' in 1976. New Mexico as-
serted that the Wild Horses Act went beyond protection of federal prop-
164. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
165. Id. at 434.
166. Id.at433.
167. Cerritos Gun Club v. Hall, 96 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1938); Cochrane v. United States, 92 F.2d
623 (7th Cir. 1937).
168. 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
169. "[Tlhe power of the United States to thus protect its lands and property does not admit of
doubt,... the game laws or any other statute of the state to the contrary notwithstanding." Id. at 100
(citations omitted).
170. New Mexico Game Comm'n v. Udall, 410 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
961 (1969); Chalk v. United States, 114 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1940); Frost v. Garrison, 201 F. Supp.
389 (D. Wyo. 1962).
171. 426 U.S. 529(1976).
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erty, emphasized in Hunt, to protection of the animals themselves. It
claimed that because the animals were state property, the Act was beyond
the scope of federal power.172 A unanimous Court rejected the dubious
distinction, holding that federal power over wildlife on federal lands was
plenary, limited only by constitutional prohibition. 173 The commerce
clause and other issues were not reached, nor was the ownership claim,
although the opinion contained language indicating that the federal gov-
ernment might be able to claim a higher ownership priority. 174 Since no
federal ownership claim had ever been made, however, that question re-
mains operi. 175
The validity of state wildlife law has been a more frequent subject of
litigation. In 1924, the Court considered whether Louisiana's levy of a
"severance" tax on trapped fur and hide-bearing animals burdened inter-
state commerce. In holding that it did not, the opinion in La Coste v.
Department of Conservation176 cited Geer for the proposition that states
own wildlife "so far as capable of ownership," but the decision did not
rest on the ground that state ownership interdicted interstate commerce
before it began. 177 A challenge in 1928 to another Louisiana statute fur-
ther restricted Geer. 178 Louisiana required that all shrimp taken in its wa-
ters be processed in the state before interstate transportation. This im-
posed a considerable burden on plaintiff shrimpers for whom processing
in Mississippi was far more economical. Geer supported Louisiana's
argument that as owner, proprietor, and regulator of its wildlife, it could
condition "transfer of title" as it chose. 179 The Court looked to Geer but
rejected the argument. The conservation purpose behind the statute was
"feigned" as Louisiana did not attempt to keep the shrimp as a domestic
food source, so "[as] to such shrimp the protection of the commerce
clause attaches at the time of taking." 180 Th Court ruled that allowing
the initial taking terminates state control, and "put[s] an end to the trust
upon which the State is deemed to own or control the shrimp for the bene-
fit of its people." 181
172. The State's arguments are dissected in Coggins & Hensley, supra note 65.
173. 426 U.S. at 536-41.
174. Id. at 537-38.
175. This aspect is discussed futher at notes 247-56 and accompanying text infra.
176. 263 U.S. 545 (1924).
177. Id. at 549. The tax was upheld as a valid police power measure designed to conserve the
animals, the Court noting that the tax applied whether or not the pelts were shipped out of state. Id. at
550-51.
178. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
179. Id. at 8.
180. Id.at12-13.
181. Id. at 13.
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Commercial fishing for sponges, shrimps, oysters, and other offshore
denizens has continued to occupy the Supreme Court and to contribute to
Geer's demise. Although the Court did not cite it, The Abby Dodge was
probably overruled in Skeriotes v. Florida. 182 At issue was the converse
of The Abby Dodge situtation: defendant was convicted of violating a
Florida statute prohibiting the use of diving suits in sponge fishing in the
state's waters. He claimed Florida could not regulate activities outside of
one marine league from its land boundaries. 183 The ownership of offshore
lands was not resolved until some years later. 184 The Skeriotes Court held
only that Florida could control the activities of its citizens even on the
high seas. 185 Significantly for these purposes, the Court also stated:
It is also clear that Florida has an interest in the proper maintenance of the
sponge fishery and that the statute so far as applied to conduct within the
territorial waters of Florida, in the absence of conflicting federal legislation,
is within the police power of the State. 186
The 1948 companion cases of Toomer v. Witsell' 87 and Takahashi v. Fish
and Game Commission 88 should have-but did not-overrule Geer. In
Toomer, the Court examined two South Carolina statutes that taxed
shrimp catch and required a shrimp fishery license fee for non-residents
one hundred times that charged residents. The Court held that the latter
statute violated the privileges and immunities clause. The state argued
that it was regulating the corpus of its trust for the interests of its citizens.
The Court unpersuasively distinguished McCready v. Virginia,189 noted
the "slender reed" comments of Justice Holmes, and went on to state:
"The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a
fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a
State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important
resource."190 In a footnote, the Court commented that "the fiction appar-
182. 313U.S.69(1941).
183. Id. at 71.
184. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
185. 313 U.S. at 76-79. The Court stated:
If the United States may control the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas, we see no reason
why the State of Florida may not likewise govern the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas
with respect to matters in which the State has a legitimate interest and where there is no conflict
with acts of Congress.
Id. at 77.
186. Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
187. 334U.S. 385 (1948).
188. 334 U.S.410 (1948).
189. 94 U.S. 391 (1876). The basis for distinction was the migratory nature of the shrimp versus
the sedentary nature of the oysters in McCready, which would remain in the state until harvested.
190. 334 U.S. at 402.
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ently gained currency partly as a result of confusion between [Roman le-
gal terms]."' 191 In Takahashi the Court relied on the equal protection
clause in holding that California could not deny a commercial fishing li-
cense to a resident alien on the ground that he was ineligible for U.S.
citizenship.192 The state ownership claim was rejected, conflicting cases
were distinguished, and the assumed conservation purpose of the statute
was deemed insufficient to justify an exception to the fourteenth amend-
ment. 193
Toomer was restricted and Takahashi reaffirmed by recent Supreme
Court opinions. In Douglas v. Seacoast Products Inc., 194 decided in
1977, Virginia statutes that denied commercial fishing licenses to aliens
and restricted the rights of other non-residents to fish were struck down.
The Court did not reach privileges and immunities or equal protection ar-
guments because it found that federal licensing for "mackerel fisheries"
under the ancient federal statute at issue in Gibbons v. Ogden'95
preempted the state laws. As to congressional power to regulate fisheries,
the Court stated:
While appellant may be correct in arguing that at earlier times in our history
there was some doubt whether Congress had power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate the taking of fish in state waters [citing McCready, Man-
chester, and Geer], there can be no question today that such power exists
where there is some effect on interstate commerce .... The movement of
vessels from one State to another in search of fish, and back again to pro-
cessing plants, is certainly activity which Congress could conclude affects
interstate commerce. 196
After the Court again dismissed ownership notions as nineteenth century
legal fictions, it concluded that" [u]nder modem analysis, the question is
simply whether the State has exercised its police power in conformity
with the federal laws and Constitution." 1 97
The following year the Court distinguished Toomer in upholding a
Montana game licensing system which allowed a resident to hunt elk for
$9 while requiring a non-resident to purchase a combination license for
191. Id. at 402 n.37.
192. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410,421 (1948).
193. Id. at 415-21. In Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914), the Court had upheld a
state law that barred aliens from hunting wild game. After discussing that case as well as McCready,
Geer, and Foster-Fountain, the Court said: "To whatever extent the fish ... may be 'capable of
ownership' by California, we think that 'ownership' is inadequate to justify... excluding any or all
aliens who are lawful residents... from making a living by fishing." 334 U.S. at 421.
194. 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
195. 22U.S. (9Wheat.) I(1824).
196. 431 U.S. at 281-82 (citations omitted).
197. Id. at 284-85.
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$225. The majority in Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Mon-
tana'98 found that the scheme was not totally unreasonable or discrimina-
tory for a variety of reasons. However, the essence of its decision was
that recreational huntipg-as distinguished from the "livelihood" pur-
sued by the Toomer plaintiffs-is not one of those fundamental rights
necessary for national unity that is protected under the privileges and im-
munities clause. 199 Geer got a reprieve: the Court acknowledged that the
doctrine for which it stands is anachronistic, but still thought that it repre-
sented a greater truth. "The fact that the State's control over wildlife is
not exclusive and absolute in the face of federal regulation and certain
federally protected interests does not compel the conclusion that it is
meaningless in their absence.' '200 Oddly enough, the Baldwin plaintiffs
seem not to have raised objections under the commerce clause. Perhaps
bedazzled by the similarities with Toomer, they may have forfeited a bet-
ter argument. 201.
Less than a year later the Supreme Court used a case of little practical
importance to overrule Geer, but offered little guidance to replace it. An
Oklahoma statute prohibited the export of "natural" minnows while al-
lowing export of commercially raised minnows. The Oklahoma appellate
court upheld the statute against the contention that it unduly burdened in-
terstate commerce by pointing to its conservation purpose and by relying
on Geer.202 Justice Brennan, writing for the 7-2 majority in Hughes v.
Oklahoma,20 3 first noted the rejection of the Geer analysis in cases in-
volving state regulation of natural resources other than wildlife. 2°4 He
198. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
199. Id. at 388.
200. Id. at 386.
201. The big game hunting at issue is certainly of interstate character. Concentration on the hunt-
ers' interest led to the relative exclusion of considering the guides' and suppliers' positions, both
groups which are heavily dependent upon out-of-state customers. Interstate travel and interstate
movement of goods and services are inextricably linked to and affected by the Montana system which
facially impedes, exploits, and discriminates against it. On the surface, it is difficult to square the
Montana license fee discrimination with the holdings in Tooner, Hughes, see notes 202-10 infra,
and Foster-Fountain. Reconciliation can be achieved only through according the conservation pur-
pose behind the state law the status of a complete defense. And, in fact, where state laws have been
held to violate the commerce clause, the Court has painstakingly examined and rejected state "con-
servation" defenses. The Court has attached high importance to wildlife conservation purposes un-
derlying state statutes in other areas. For example, even though Indians have a treaty right to take fish
free of state game laws on the reservation, the state may still impose gross taking limitations if
necessary to preserve the fish run. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977)
(Puyallup III).
202. Hughes v. State, 572 P.2d 573, 575 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
203. 441 U.S. 322(1979).
204. Id. at 325-26. The Court declared that it had first rejected a Geer-like analysis in West v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (Oklahoma statute that forbade the export of natural
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'looked to the cases rejecting an attenuated "conservation" basis as a jus-
tification for restrictions on interstate commerce. 20 5 The shellfish cases
then were analyzed to show that the "Geer analysis has also been eroded
to the point of virtual extinction in cases involving regulation of wild ani-
mals." 20 6 The only remaining vitality of Geer was in "cases involving
complete embargoes on interstate commerce in a wild animal" which
"created the anomalous result that the most burdensome laws enjoyed the
most protection from Commerce Clause attack.' '207 The Court held that
wildlife regulation would now be evaluated "according to the same gen-
eral rule applied to state regulations of other natural resources. "208 Under
that test, the Oklahoma statute was invalid: it was overtly discriminatory
and burdensome on its face, and its rationalization as a conservation mea-
sure would not stand because Oklahoma did not attempt to limit directly
the number of "natural" minnows nor to regulate their disposition within
the state. 20 9 On the other hand, dicta in the opinion strongly reaffirmed
"in ways not inconsistent with the commerce clause, the legitimate state
concerns for conservation and protection of wild animals underlying the
19th century legal fiction of state ownership." 210 The dissenters, Justice
Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger, disagreed with the majority's princi-
pal conclusions, but were comforted by its acknowledgment that states
retain broad management powers. 211
The persistent erosion and final demise of the state ownership concept
as extrapolated from Geer is important primarily because Geer is the
main, and perhaps the only, legal underpinning for the corollary notions,
still fashionable in some conservative bastions, that state regulation is ex-
clusive under the tenth amendment, and that all direct federal wildlife
regulation save the MBTA is therefore invalid. 212 These corollary propo-
gas struck down as offensive to the commerce clause).
205. Id. at 329-31. (citing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), holding
unconstitutional the state's refusal to issue license for milk processing plant to a company intending
to export milk purchased from local farmers, and Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553
(1923) (invalidating state statute prohibiting export of natural gas)).
206. Id. at 331.
207. Id.at333.
208. Id. at 335.
209. Id. at 336-38.
210. Id. at 335-36.
211. Id. at 341 n.4 (dissenting opinion).
212. Shortly before Hughes was announced, a federal judge threw out the federal Airborne Hunt-
ing Act on just those grounds. See United States v. Helsey, 463 F. Supp. Il I (D. Mont. 1979),
criticized at notes 283-96 and accompanying text infra. The Ninth Circuit recently reversed that
decision. See No. 79-1100, slip op. at 745 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1979), and note 293 infra. As a legal
position, the tenth amendment argument has been less than tenuous since Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416 (1920), but its persistence is rooted in politics and fear. State legislators and state game
agencies deeply resent what they see as federal intrusion into a matter of local concern, and they fear
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sitions are not merely eccentric. Congress has consistently deferred to
state sensibilities in matters of wildlife regulation. 21 3 And, even in the
absence of statutory guidance, federal regulators have consistently de-
ferred to state agencies on many issues out of an ill-founded concern
for-if not belief in-the sanctity of state preeminence. 21 4 The founda-
tion for these misapprehensions has now collapsed.
It must be recognized, however, that while the Supreme Court has es-
tablished some flexible principles concerning the constitutional powers of
state and federal governments to regulate wildlife, it has decided rela-
tively few specific questions. As to the power of the federal government,
the Court's holdings can be quickly summarized. The Migratory Bird
Treaty Act is in general valid as the domestic implementation of a valid
treaty. 215 Federal marine fisheries legislation is valid under the commerce
clause and preempts state law. 2 16 Federal agencies, if authorized to do so,
may regulate wildlife on federal lands even in contravention of state
law. 217 When the legislative command is clear, and the state law conflicts
with it, the state law is preempted insofar as it was intended to operate on
federal lands. 2 18 Congress or the President may set aside lands for the
protection of wildlife, 2 19 and the withdrawal of water necessary to serve
that purpose overrides conflicting subsequent state-created water
rights. 220 Congress also may command federal agencies to refrain from
taking actions that will harm certain species even though private and other
governmental interests may suffer thereby. 221
the loss of license revenue should the federal government embark on a more active game management
program. See Coggins & Hensley, supra note 65, at 1150.
213. See note 117 supra. A recent example of congressional deference is the pending Alaska
Lands Bill. All early versions contained language virtually abdicating a federal role in wildlife man-
agement on retained federal lands. On the other hand, some members of Congress are less willing to
concede to state control. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 9 ERC 21 I1, 2115-17 (D.D.C. 1977)
(Alaska Wolf II) (discussion of the legislative history of the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976)).
214. A brief history of federal-state wildlife agency relations, proceeding from the traditional
state viewpoint but somewhat modified by the repeated decisions adverse to that position, is re-
counted in Gottshalk, The State-Federal Partnership in Wildlife Conservation. in WiLoLnF AND
AMERICA, supra note I, at 290-301.
215. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
216. Douglas v. Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
217. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
218. See cases cited in note 217 supra.
219. The principle is implicit in Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), and explicit in
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-93 n.10 (1972), where, in refer-
ence to federal land acquisitions under the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929, 16 U.S.C. §§
715-715r (1976), the Court noted that "we deal with an unquestionably appropriate and specific
exercise of congressional regulatory power."
220. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
221. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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The Court's decisiohs concerning state wildlife legislation have cov-
ered a wider range, but with less precision. The holdings of the nineteenth
century cases are of little precedential value although many of the general
principles enunciated therein have continuing relevance. The states have
broad powers and discretion to conserve their wildlife. The state remains
the trustee for the people even if it is not a technical owner. But state
regulation must be consistent with constitutional constraints and guaran-
tees. It cannot unduly burden interstate commerce, 222 it cannot abridge
the privileges and immunities of non-residents in pursuing their liveli-
hood,223 it cannot forbid what the federal government has expressly
permitted,224 and it cannot deny equal protection by discriminating
against resident aliens.225 None of those prohibitions, however, is clear-
cut or absolute; interstate commerce can be impeded to some extent if the
state has a compelling conservation purpose;226 only livelihoods, not re-
creational pursuits, are entitled to protection as privileges or immuni-
ties;227 some discrimination against non-residents is permissible;228 and
the boundaries of federal preemption are vague.229
III. FEDERAL POWER TO PROTECT AND MANAGE
WILDLIFE
Wildlife law will remain inchoate and unsettled until the constitution-
ality of the present mosaic of federal wildlife law is definitively estab-
lished. Without an authoritative ruling, states will continue to resist fed-
eral intrusion, federal officials will continue to be timorous or
oversolicitous, and enforcement will continue to suffer.
Although federal wildlife statutes protect only a relatively few species
of wildlife,23° they are all-pervasive in that they proscribe or restrict all
activities affecting those species in some situations. The ESA, for in-
222. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
223. Toomerv. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
224. Douglas v. Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
225. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
226. Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545 (1924) (upholding state's power to
tax skins and hides intended for shipment in interstate commerce). Dicta in Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1979), also support that conclusion.
227. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371(1978).
- 228. Id.
229. See generally Part IV infra.
230. Federal law does not directly affect the great majority of non-avian wildlife in America
(mammals, fishes, crustaceans, insects, reptiles, amphibians, and so forth); it directly protects only a
small but growing number of endangered or threatened species plus, of course, the dozen or so spe-
cies of marine mammals and two "species" of feral ungulates.
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stance, absolutely prohibits certain actions by all persons at all times in
all places.23' Each of the five main federal species statutes forbids the
killing of the designated animals on private as well as federal property.
Moreover, Congress outlawed the sale of such species without evaluating
their value or habits. 232 Whence derives Congress such all-encompassing
power?
The existence or nonexistence of a general federal power to regulate
wildlife has been and is being litigated in a variety of contexts. Even
though federal wildlife statutes have been upheld in all but one law-
suit, 233 the depth of feeling engendered by the issue guarantees that new
challenges will arise. Now that the "ownership" argument is no longer
available, challengers may assert that wildlife regulation is necessarily a
matter of local concern, that the state prerogative has been conceded by
the history of federal acquiescence, that this is a power or right reserved
to the states and their people by the tenth amendment, that federal law
impermissibly intrudes into a fundamental facet of state sovereignty,234
and that no enumerated constitutional power allows Congress to regulate
wildlife off federal lands absent a treaty. Some cases may present claims
that certain applications of the federal statutes violate the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. 235 Federal wildlife law proponents will reply that all
existing federal laws-and likely future extensions of such laws-are
validly grounded in the property clause, the treaty clause, and the com-
merce clause, and are in any event "necessary and proper" to effectuate
important national goals.
A. Which Statutes are Arguably Vulnerable?
Perusal of the wide spectrum of federal statutes narrows the inquiry
considerably, for many are unquestionably valid. Most federal statutes
are presumptively constitutional in whole or part either as a public land
management measure or as a command to federal agencies. It is clear that
231. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1976) ("any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States" is prohibited without exception from "taking" endangered species). See, e.g., Palila v. Ha-
waii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 991-92 (D. Hawaii 1979) (holding
defendant state among those defined as a "person" in the ESA).
232. See Coggins & Hensley, supra note 65, at 1112-22.
233. United States v. Helsey, 463 F. Supp. lll(D. Mont.) rev'd, No. 79-1100, slip op. at 745
(9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1979). See notes 283-92 and accompanying text infra.
234. This argument may be premised on National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976) (holding that federal wage and hour laws, as applied to state employees, impermissibly in-
truded into the separate and independent sovereign status of states). Any application of National
League of Cities to federal wildlife law is at best highly unlikely. See Note, Endangered Species Act:
Constitutional Tensions and Regulatory Discord, 4 COLUM J. ENv-r'L L. 97 (1977).
235. E.g., Globe Fur Dyeing Corp. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 177 (D.D.C. 1978).
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pursuant to the property clause, congressional power over federal lands
and their resources is plenary and overrides contrary state law. 236 The
property clause alone is therefore a sufficient basis not only for all of the
federal land management statutes, 237 but also for all of the species stat-
utes insofar as they operate on public lands.2 38 The Endangered Species
Act, for instance, is partly immune to challenge on that ground. 239 Un-
questionably Congress may command federal agencies to use wildlife
values as a guiding or conclusive criterion in making resource allocation
decisions. 240 Thus, the "consideration" statutes are reasonably invulner-
able also. Further, no constitutional attack on the "financing" statutes is
likely to be made or to succeed. 241
The question is thus reduced primarily to the validity of the species
statutes, other than the MBTA, as they operate directly to restrict indi-
vidual activities on state or private lands. In Kleppe v. New Mexico, the
Court declined to decide whether the Wild Horses Act was valid and
overrode state law as to horses and burros found off federal lands. 242
Since none of the species statutes are limited to federal lands in their
reach, a part of each statute remains constitutionally suspect.
B. Which Enumerated Powers Support Federal
Wildlife Regulation?
The application of federal wildlife laws to persons other than federal
officers acting on non-federal lands is supported by three explicit and one
or more implicit powers granted to Congress by the Consitution. The
property clause has an extraterritorial reach of an undefined extent. The
treaty power may serve to validate all federal species statues by itself.
The commerce clause is a firm foundation for the MMPA and probably
for all of the other species statutes. Moreover, should none of those bases
be deemed sufficient, Congress has, or should have, an inherent, derived
power to pass legislation necessary and proper for the preservation of
236. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976), and cases cited therein.
237. See note 117 supra.
238. The Wild Horses Act, like the other federal species statutes, applies on private as well as
federal lands. See Coggins & Hensley, supra note 65, at 1102-04. The Supreme Court's holding in
Kleppe that the statute was valid on federal lands perforce validates the other statutes insofar as they
apply on federal public lands.
239. Section 7 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976), applies to all federal actions, necessarily
including public land management decisions. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). While many
have questioned the wisdom of section 7, no one has doubted its constitutionality.
240. The pertinent statutes are listed in note 118 supra. In fact, no case has been located in which
it was even claimed that NEPA and its ilk were constitutionally flawed.
241. Federal grants with federal conditions attached are common in all areas of governmental
endeavor.
242. 426 U.S. at 546-47.
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those things of practical or symbolic national importance. 243
1. The Property Clause
In addition to the plenary power over federal lands that it gives to Con-
gress, the property clause of the Constitution also supports legislation that
protects federal lands by restricting activities on private lands. But the
extent of its extraterritorial scope has never been well-defined because
Congress rarely has chosen to exercise or test it. The power extends to
adjacent lands to the extent necessary to protect federal lands from enclo-
sure244 or fire, 245 but it does not countenance the use or taking of adjacent
lands for access without compensation. 246
Does the property power authorize the regulation of wildlife off federal
lands? It can be argued that the property clause supports the federal spe-
cies statutes in two ways. First, from the premise that some member of
nearly every species of native fauna spends some part of its life on federal
land, 247 it could be contended that federal protection is acquired from that
sojourn which attaches to all species wherever they may roam. The draw-
backs to such a theory are obvious: it is highly and artificially conceptual;
its factual premises cannot be proven conclusively; and it has no direct
support in any case or statute other than the Wild Horses Act. 248
Nevertheless, it is mildly attractive as a simple solution.
Second, it could be argued that the United States has a property interest
in all wild native fauna in the nation superior to that of any state or indi-
vidual. The United States would not have to claim sole ownership or an
243. That argument, premised on cases involving symbols such as flags and on language in Mis-
souri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920), was made in Coggins & Hensley. supra note 65. at
1139-43. It may have been partially accepted in Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural
Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Ha. 1979), discussed at notes 318-28 accompanying text infra.
244. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
245. United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927). See also Shannon v. United States. 160 F.
870 (9th Cir. 1908); United States v. Johnston, 38 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.W.Va. 1941). See generally
Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property. 18 ARIZ L. REV. 283 (1976): Sax. Help-
less Giants: The National Parks and the Regulation of Private Lands. 75 MICH L. REV 239 (1977).
246. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
247. Note, Federal Protection of Endangered Wildlife Species, 22 STAN L. REv 1289. 1296
(1970).
248. Congress characterized wild horses and burros as components of the federal lands: they
'are to be considered in the area where presently found, as an integral part of the natural system of
the public lands." 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). This formulation was sustained as a ' 'needful' regula-
tion 'respecting' the public lands," in Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 536, but only as to public lands. In other
cases, movement and migration, rather than place of sojourn, have been the key elements in sustain-
ing the federal power under the commerce clause. E.g., Cerritos Gun Club v. Hall, 96 F.2d 620 (9th
Cir. 1938) (holding interstate bird migration to be interstate commerce and therefore subject to fed-
eral regulation).
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exclusive right to control. 249 Instead, it could reason that this theory is the
logical extension of the public trust doctrine whereby the government is
entitled to-and indeed must-preserve public natural resources for the
people. 250 The federal duty and power necessarily must be superior to that
retained by the states, 251 because wildlife is a national resource which by
its nature cannot be preserved or managed by state efforts alone. 252 A ju-
dicial holding that the United States "owned" wildlife would be revolu-
tionary, would go far beyond present federal law, would be bitterly
contested, and would appall many federal as well as state game officials.
It would have the virtue, however, of cutting the ideological Gordian
Knot that has so long detracted from cooperative state-federal manage-
ment efforts by conceding that ultimate regulatory authority is at the level
of government where in fact it has resided for some time. Again, this the-
ory cannot find much precedential support. 253 On the other hand, the only
cases denying federal "proprietorship" have rested on the discredited
state ownership theory. 254 The federal agencies have never asserted an
ownership claim, although the Supreme Court has invited such as asser-
tion.255 The federal government would be well-advised to accept the invi-
tation, even if it has no intention of following it to its logical conclu-
sion.256
249. In an earlier article, this writer argued that use of traditional property concepts in relation to
creatures not actually owned in any real sense by either individuals or governments is inappropriate,
and that the important question was rather the allocation of jurisdiction. Coggins & Hensley, supra
note 65, at 1137-39. There is no good reason to depart from that position, which has been endorsed
by the Supreme Court, insofar as the Court has overruled Geer. See notes 202-11 and accompanying
text supra. If, however, property notions continue to be prominent, and if an easy way out of the
jurisdictional dilemma is needed by Congress or courts, this "federal property" theory offers one
avenue.
Even with the "state ownership" doctrine now discredited, there remain situations in which
questions of ownership priority to wildlife are appropriate and important. Compare, e.g., United
States v. Long Cove Seafood, Inc., 582 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1978) with United States v. Plott, 345 F.
Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
250. See W. RooaERs, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 170-86 (1977). Cf. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine
in NaturalResource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
251. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
252. This is the premise upon which all of the federal species statutes were enacted. In each
instance from the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 to the Endangered Species Act of 1973 Con-
gress was impelled to act in part because of the inadequacy of state conservation measures. See, e.g.,
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) ("[A] national interest of very nearly the first magni-
tude is involved. It can be protected only by national action in concert with that of another power...
But for the treaty and the statute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with.").
253. Cf. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985, 995 n.40 (D.
Hawaii 1979).
254. E.g., New Mexico v. Morton, 406 F. Supp. 1237, 1238 (D.N.M. 1975), rev'd sub nom.
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
255. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 537 (1976): "it is far from clear... that Congress
cannot assert a property interest in the regulated horses and burros superior to that of the State."
256. It is unlikely, however, that Congress would be willing to disturb severely the traditional
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2. The Treaty Power
The MBTA, upheld under the treaty power in Missouri v. Holland,257
applies to all persons, at all times, and in all places. 258 Implicit in that
case are the propositions that wildlife protection is properly a matter of
international concern and agreement, 259 and that broad domestic
implementation of international wildlife treaties is valid, without regard
to asserted reserved state powers.2 60 If, then, the other four federal stat-
utes implement international agreements, they are presumptively valid in
all applications, at least to the extent they do not contravene individual
rights and liberties.
A tenuous argument can be made that all federal wildlife statutes are
supported by the treaty power. There are many international treaties con-
cerning the protection of various species to which the United States is a
party. 26 1 Two treaties are of particular relevance in this context: The 1973
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and
Fauna (CITES) 262 and the 1940 Convention for Nature Protection In the
Western Hemisphere. 263 These and other treaties were cited by Congress
as agreements which the 1973 Endangered Species Act was designed to
implement.26 4 The ESA is valid, therefore, if two problems of interpreta-
tion can be overcome. First, the Act was passed and effective before the
Treaty was ratified by the requisite number of nations in 1975.265 That
fact amounts merely to a formal legalism which should have no bearing
on the statute's validity. The second obstacle is more substantial: CITES
deals only with international trade in wildlife, while the ESA goes far be-
yond trade restrictions in its purported implementation. The Convention
jurisdictional allocation. The "property" solution is offered as a means of resolving the question of
power. Whether, or to what extent, the federal government should exercise such a power are separate
questions not dealt with herein.
257. 252 U.S.416(1920).
258. Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 705, 707 (1976).
259. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 545.
260. "If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute . . . as a
necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government." Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. at 432.
261. These are listed and reproduced in CONGRESSONAL RESEARCH SERV. STAFFOF SENATE COMM
ON COMMERCE. 95TH CONG IsT SEss. TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON FISHERIES.
OCEANOGRAPHIC RESOURCES. AND WILDLIFE INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES (Comm. Print 1977). Now be-
ing considered is a treaty to protect all migratory species. See note 122 supra.
262. March 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEG MATS 1085
(1973).
263. Oct. 12, 1940, 56 Stat. 1354 (1942), T.S. No. 981, 161 U.N.T.S. 173.
264. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 (4)(c), (f) (1976).
265. The Act was passed in December 1973 but the Treaty did not receive sufficient ratifications
to become effective until July 1975. 73 DEP'T STATE BULL 607 (1975).
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contemplates and encourages but does not require such measures. 266 The
lack of precise convergence in language should be deemed immaterial.
No such inquiry into the MBTA was undertaken in Missouri v. Holland
and none is warranted now, for the ultimate objects of both treaty and
statute are identical, and the means chosen in the statute both relate to and
effectuate the ends of the treaty.
Assuming, as is probable, that CITES alone is sufficient support for
application of the 1973 ESA, the inquiry into the general validity of
federal species statutes is almost ended. The Bald Eagle Act has become
virtually irrelevant because bald eagles are now covered by the MBTA
and the 1973 ESA, as well as by the 1940 Act. 267 Horses and burros and
non-endangered marine mammals would pose the only remaining consti-
tutional problem of coverage.
Both likely may be protected by Congress under the commerce
clause, 268 and both statutes also may be upheld as an implementation of
the 1940 Convention. That treaty called for the preservation "in their nat-
ural habitat representatives of all species and genera of their native flora
and fauna," 269 and the signatories agreed to propose "suitable laws" to
accomplish that end. 270 Arguments can be made that the 1971 and 1972
legislation was not intended to implement the 1940 treaty,27' and other
problems of interpretation are present. 272 However, the better case is in
favor of the validity of all post-1940 federal wildlife legislation as means
of implementing the treaty.273
3. The Commerce Clause
Even if the foregoing theories and doctrines were deemed insufficient
to support federal species statutes, those laws can be upheld under the
commerce clause.274 The scope of the commerce power has become vir-
tually unlimited. 275 The MBTA has been deemed a valid exercise of the
commerce power as well as the treaty power, 276 and the Endangered Spe-
266. Arts. vii, xiv, March 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, reprinted in 12 INr'L
LEG. MATS. 1085 (1973).
267. 50C.F.R. §§ 10.13, 17.11 (1978).
268. See notes 274-81 and accompanying text infra.
269. Preamble, Oct. 12, 1940, 56 Stat. 1354(1942), T.S. 981, 161 U.N.T.S. 173.
270. Id. at art. V.
271. Neither the Wild Horses nor Marine Mammal statutes mention any treaty. See Coggins &
Hensley, supra note 65, at 1126-30, 1148.
272. For a discussion of those problems, such as scope, intent, and time differentials, see id.
273. Id. See notes 318-28 and accompanying text infra (discussion of the Palila case).
274. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
275. See L. TRIBE.AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 5-4 to 5-8 (1978).
276. See cases cited in note 167 supra.
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cies Act has been upheld recently under the commerce clause. 277 It would
be unreasonable to claim that wildlife in general and virtually every
species likely to be contested in particular are not in or do not affect inter-
state commerce. 278 Horses supply the dog food market, and many people
purchase items and cross state lines to observe them in their "natural"
state. 279 Marine mammals by definition spend part of their lives in navig-
able waters over which the commerce power is without limitation. 280 Spe-
cies that are not valuable for fur, meat, hide, oil, or feathers nevertheless
frequently comprise tourist attractions patronized by interstate travelers.
Many species, not counting migratory birds, often cross state and national
boundaries or are found in navigable inland waters.281 In short, while a
few species may appear to be sedentary, lacking in economic value, and
uninteresting, the overwhelming majority of American fauna clearly are
in or affect interstate commerce and are thus subject to federal regulation.
C. HOW HAVE THESE THEORIES FARED IN PRACTICE?
The foregoing powers, singly or in combination, almost conclusively
establish the validity of federal wildlife statutes in relation to private per-
sons and private property. But the question is not closed, for many liti-
gants and a few courts continue to cling to turn-of-the-century concep-
tions when confronted with federal regulation of wildlife. At least seven
cases have been brought since Kleppe was decided in 1976 in which
parties have attempted to invalidate one or more federal wildlife statutes.
Three plaintiffs lost, one dropped the invalidity argument, 282 and one pre-
vailed. The remaining two cases are pending.
In United States v. Helsey,2 83 the Montana Federal District Court ruled
that the federal Airborne Hunting Act 284 violates the tenth amendment.
The decision is wrong on all counts. The Act prohibits shooting animals
from airplanes under penalty of a fine up to $5,000 or a year's imprision-
ment or both. 285 Defendants, in the first reported case arising under the
277. See the discussion of the Palila case at notes 318-28 and accompanying text infra.
278. See Note, supra note 247, at 1300. See generally D. ENGDAHL. supra note 106, at 86-87.
279. See Coggins & Hensley, supra note 65, at 1132-34.
280. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824). See Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 HARv L. REv 1,23-24 (1959).
281. Note, supra note 247, at 1300.
282. Andrus v. Allard, 48 U.S.L.W. 4013 (Nov. 27, 1979), discussed at notes 380-97 and
accompanying text infra.
283. 463 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Mont.) rev'd, No. 79-1100, slip op. at 75 (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 1979).
See note 293 infra.
284. 16U.S.C. §742j-1 (1976).
285. Id. at § 742j-l(a). Exceptions are provided for employees and agents of state and federal
governments. Id. at § 742j- 1 (b)(1).
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Act, moved to dismiss the information, claiming "unlawful preemption
of reserved state regulatory authority."286 The court agreed in an opinion
redolent with obsolete authorities and question-begging. The court opined
that reserved tenth amendment powers are exclusive. It buttressed this
conclusion by reference to the first child labor case, 287 now merely a
discarded blot on our constitutional escutcheon. 288 The additional conclu-
sion that wildlife regulation was one of those exclusive powers was
reached by reliance on a misconceived interpretation of Geer289 and on
the two early migratory bird cases made irrelevant by Missouri v. Hol-
land.290 After a discursion into seemingly irrelevant Indian law, the court
noted that federal legislators and agencies had doubts of the Airborne
Hunting Act's validity, and it distinguished Kleppe v. New Mexico on the
ground that the Act applied to all lands.29' Interestingly, it appears from
the opinion that the airborne nimrods were apprehended on an Indian res-
ervation held by the United States in trust for the tribe. 292
Helsey has subsequently been reversed by the Ninth Circuit.293 Wild-
life is not owned by the state, and states have no exclusive regulatory ju-
risdiction, whether or not the regulatory power was one reserved by the
tenth amendment. If the offense occurred upon federal lands,294 Kleppe
and the property clause control and the court need go no further. The Act
also will stand under the commerce clause: regulation of air travel is
almost exclusively a federal function, 295 and the plane, its occupants, its
use, and its weapons are in or affect interstate commerce. 296
286. 463 F. Supp. at 1112.
287. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
288. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). See Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over
Federal Property, 18 AMIZ. L. REV. 283,312-14 (1976).
289. The court thought that Geer "determined that the right to control and regulate fish and wild-
life is reserved to the states." 463 F.Supp. at 1113. There was not, however, a tenth amendment
issue in Geer. A conflicting federal statute was not involved, and the case cannot be read to claim
absolute exclusivity in any event. Geer was overruled shortly after Helsey was decided. Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
290. United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915); United States v. Shauver, 214 F.
154 (E.D. Ark. 1914), appeal dismissed, 248 U.S. 594 (1919). See notes 164-67 and accompanying
text supra.
291. The court stated that the Act "makes no differentiation between state, private, federal, or
Indian trust lands," and is "simply a national hunting regulation." 463 F. Supp. at 1116.
292. The defendants were also charged with trespass upon Indian trust lands in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1165 (1976). 463 F. Supp. at 1112. Whether or to what extent lands held by the United
States in trust for tribes is "federal land" for purposes of the Kleppe rationale is beyond the scope of
this article. See, e.g. Stone v. United States, 506 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1974).
293. The ninth circuit reversed Helsey while this article was being prepared for publication. No.
79-1100, slip op. at 745 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 1979) (Act upheld under the commerce clause).
294. See note 292 supra.
295. Burbank v. Lockheed AirTerminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973)(preempting local noise ordi-
nance).
296. Cf. Comment, State Authority to Protect Wildlife Preserved as Supreme Court Finally
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The importance of the district court's opinion in Helsey is more in the
judicial attitude it evinced than in its erroneous holding. In spite of the
unbroken line of contrary authority, many-obviously including
judges-still believe that the federal role in wildlife regulation is inappro-
priate. Most courts, however, whatever their feelings, have acknowl-
edged the constitutionality of the federal effort.
One month after Helsey was decided by the Montana district court, the
Nebraska federal district court reached the opposite conclusion on the
same question in United States v. Bair.297 Judge Urbom correctly found
that Geer "has been substantially eroded both in its reliance on title to
wildlife and, perhaps, by commerce clause cases," ' 298 and that the issue
was federal power, not the state power upheld in Geer. The Government
eschewed reliance on the property clause, arguing that the Airborne Hunt-
ing Act was sustainable under either the treaty or commerce powers. The
court was dubious as to the former claim, but finding ample support in the
commerce cases, 299 did not decide it. 300 The court upheld the Act because
Congress could reasonably have thought that such hunting "poses more
than a minimal hazard to interstate commerce. "301
Commercial plaintiffs have twice attacked the Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act. One challenge failed and the other is doomed to failure. In
Globe Fur Dyeing Corp. v. United States,302 plaintiff importer claimed
that the MMPA provisions banning the importation of skins taken from
baby seals were so biologically irrational as to violate due process and
equal protection guarantees. The District Court for the District of Colum-
bia had no difficulty finding a rational relationship between the conserva-
tion purpose of the statute and the means chosen to achieve the pur-
pose, 30 3 and summarily dismissed the suit.
In The Motor Vessels Theresa Ann v. Richardson,30 4 tuna fishermen
contend that the MMPA is unconstitutional in its application to them be-
cause: Congress did not find that porpoises affect interstate commerce;
the right to fish for tuna is a fundamental right reserved to the people by
Overturns Geer v. Connecticut, 9 ELR 10106, 10109-10 (1979).
297. 9 ELR 20324 (D. Neb. 1979).
298. Id. at 20325.
299. The court cited the wildlife cases but relied primarily on United States v. Synnes, 438 F.2d
764 (8th Cir.), vacated on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) (fel-
ons and firearms). It is perhaps unfortunate that the court chose to rely so heavily on somewhat tenu-
ous authority when far better arguments and authorities were available.
300. 9 ELR at 20325.
301. Id. at20326.
302. 467 F. Supp 177 (D.D.C. 1978).
303. Id. at 179-80.
304. 9 ERC 1510 & 1726 (S.D. Cal.), injunction stayed sub nom. Motor Vessels Theresa Ann v.
Kreps, 548 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1977).
330
Vol. 55:295, 1980
Wildlife and the Constitution
the ninth and tenth amendments; the Act works an inverse condemnation
of their purse-seine boats; and it is an unlawful delegation of legislative
authority. 305 The suit was brought in reaction to a decision of the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals that caused a temporary shutdown of the
American tuna industry after the yearly quota of porpoise deaths had been
met. 30 6 The district court was skeptical of the constitutional claims but
enjoined enforcement of the Act on pragmatic grounds. 30 7 The Ninth Cir-
cuit was even more skeptical and vacated the injunction. 30 8 No further
decisions in the case have been reported. 30 9 The plaintiffs' contentions
are wholly untenable. Even if the delegation doctrine has modem vitality,
the MMPA abounds with strict standards the administrators must meet. 310
Any livelihood is an important interest, 311 but none rises above congres-
sional power to regulate its exercise in the interest of conservation. 312 The
contention that Congress had to or failed to make "findings" is plainly
wrong on all counts, 313 and the argument that a "taking" of the plaintiffs'
livelihood occurred is more than met by showing that as many tuna were
taken after the MMPA went into effect as ever before. 314 The commerce
power by itself is an adequate constitutional foundation for the MMPA,
and plaintiffs must fail.
Several other federal statutes were attacked in Allard v. Andrus,315 but
the decision was limited to the validity of regulations under those Acts
and will be discussed below. Another case is reportedly pending in which
a Minnesota dairy farmer asserts the unconstitutionality of the
Endangered Species Act insofar as it prevents him from killing wolves
allegedly killing his COWS. 3 16 No decision in the case was located, but a
305. Coggins,'Developments, supra note 27, at 92-93 n.290.
306. Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976)..
See Nafziger & Armstrong, The Porpoise-Tuna Controversy: Management of Marine Resources after
Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 7 ENVT'L L. 223 (1977).
307. 9 ERC at 1726.
308. 9 ERC at 2072.
309. While this article was being prepared for publication, counsel for plaintiffs have informed
the author that the lawsuit has been dismissed voluntarily.
310. See, e.g., Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
311. Compare Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), and Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), with Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
312. Indian treaty beneficiaries, for instance, have a very high priority "right" to take a share of
fish " 'at all usual and accustomed places,' " but even that right can be modified or regulated to
preserve the resource. See Coggins & Modrcin, supra note 3, at 385-87, 392-95.
313. The cases of Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1964); and United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) establish that facts supporting the legislative judg-
ment are presumed and can be garnered from hearing records. See Coggins & Hensley, supra note
65, at 1133.
314. Alverson, Commercial Fishing, in WILDLIFEAND AmERiCA, supra note 1, at 67, 75 fig. 6.
315. See Part IV-B infra.
316. Brozonowski v. Secretary, Civ. 5-77-19, (D. Minn., filed February, 1977).
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related opinion holds that federal wolf control efforts adjacent to the same
farm exceeded the scope of Interior Department regulations. 317 From the
facts as reported in the latter decision, the extent of actual depredation
appears minimal and the question insubstantial.
Yet another Endangered Species Act case, the Palila case, 318 decided
in June, 1979, is destined, if appealed, to be dispositive of the issues con-
sidered in this section. The Palila (Psittirostra bailleui) is an endangered
species of Hawaiian honeycreeper occupying a well-defined but shrinking
habitat. The habitat, consisting primarily of state-owned mamane forests,
also contains herds of feral sheep and goats which are maintained by the
state to afford "sport" hunting. But the feral animals destroy the mamane
forest and thus contribute to the precarious status of the forest-dependent
Palila. The Sierra Club brought suit in the name of the species, 319 seeking
an order requiring the removal of the sheep and goats from the Palila hab-
itat area on the ground that maintenance of the herds was a "taking" of
the endangered species prohibited by section 9 of the Endangered Species
Act. 320 Plaintiffs prevailed on the merits, but more to the point for present
purposes is the court's treatment of Hawaii's claim that the 1973 ESA is
unconstitutional. The situation is close to the prototype described above
as posing the ultimate question: the actions by state officials pursuing
state policy took place on state land, and the species neither migrates
across state lines nor has any apparent commercial value.
The district court recognized that no Supreme Court case was on point;
even Missouri v. Holland was distinguishable because the species there
involved were migratory.32' But the holding in that case nevertheless con-
trolled, the court ruled, because both the migratory bird treaty with Ja-
pan322 and the 1940 Western Hemisphere Convention323 covered the situ-
ation in issue. Whether those treaties are self-executing was deemed
317. Fund for Animals v. Andrus, II ERC 2189 (D. Minn. 1978) (Minnesota Wolf).
318. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979).
319. Cf. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S.
CAL. L. REv. 450 (1972). Other plaintiffs were also named to avoid questions of standing.
320. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1976). The extensive definition of the activities that may
amount to a prohibited taking are discussed in Coggins & Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 CoLo. L. REv. 165, 193-95 (1979).
321. 471 F. Supp. at 933 n.28. The court did, however, rely heavily on the principles enunciated
in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Id. at 992-94. The court also distinguished Baldwin,
Hughes, and Douglas, but found within each implicit support for the federal legislation. Id. at 992,
992 nn.25-27.
322. Convention for the Protection of Migratory and Endangered Birds, March 4, 1972, 25
U.S.T. 3329, T.I.A.S. No. 7990. That the treaty dealt primarily with birds that migrated between
American and Japanese territory was immaterial because (I) the Palila was among the species desig-
nated for protection; (2) only some sections were limited to migratory birds; and (3) island birds were
the subject of special attention. 471 F. Supp. at 993, 993 n.3 1.
323. Oct. 12, 1940, 45 Stat. 1354 (1942), T.S. No. 981, 161 U.N.T.S. 173.
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irrelevant, for Congress had acted to implement them. In doing so, said
the court, Congress recognized "that protection of the Palila as an endan-
gered species is a national interest of the first magnitude. '324 The com-
merce clause too was thought to support the Act:
Congress has determined that protection of any endangered species any-
where is of the utmost importance to mankind, and that the major cause of
extinction is destruction of natural habitat. In this context, a national
program to protect and improve the natural habitats of endangered species
preserves the possibilities of interstate commerce in these species and of in-
terstate movement of persons, such as amateur students of nature or profes-
sional scientists who come to a state to observe and study these species, that
would otherwise be lost by state inaction. 325
The court then strongly intimated in a footnote that the United States
"owned" the Palila. 326 It recognized that "the question goes two steps
beyond Kleppe," but stated that "[t]he importance of preserving such a
national resource may be of such magnitude as to rise to the level of a
federal property interest.' '327 Finally, the court disposed of the notion that
the eleventh amendment immunizes Hawaii from this suit: states may be
enjoined from violating federal law; Congress specifically authorized
suits against states in this context; and Hawaii had waived any immunity
by participating in the federal endangered species program.32 8
If upheld, the Palila case would conclusively answer the question of
federal power. It dealt with the penultimate 329 situation: a non-migratory,
commercially valueless species harmed by indirect but purposeful action
of the state. If the federal government can protect the Palila (and force
affirmative wildlife management methods on state lands) it can protect
any species the Congress chooses. 330
The foregoing discussion establishes with reasonable certainty that all
existing federal wildlife legislation is in general constitutionally valid.
That proposition is important as a practical matter, for when the question
of basic constitutionality is resolved affirmatively, the analytical focus
perforce proceeds to the problem of defining the new federal-state rela-
tionship in terms of jurisdiction over wildlife management. The initial
problem is one of preemption: Given the validity of federal statutes, how
324. 471 F. Supp. at 994 n.35.
325. Id. at 994-95 (footnotes omitted).
326. Id. at 995 n.40.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 995-99.
329. The ultimate question will arise when the sedentary, commercially valueless species is not
protected by a treaty.
330. See Part V-D infra.
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does that affect the validity or applicability of state statutes on the same
subject? But before considering that question, sui generis constitutional
objections to particular federal wildlife statutes and regulations will be
examined.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL WILDLIFE
LAW AS APPLIED
The foregoing discussion has considered the validity of federal wildlife
regulation short of contravening express or implied constitutionally guar-
anteed freedoms. A federal statute aimed at constitutionally permissible
goals may still be invalid if the means chosen by Congress or an imple-
menting agency violate a constitutional prohibition. Three such potential
problems are taken up in this Part. Section A recounts an instance of al-
leged unconstitutionality by assimilation. Section B discusses the
burgeoning opinions wrestling with the question whether sale of a wild-
life artifact that was acquired legally can be made a crime. Knowledge
and scienter as requirements for criminal convictions in wildlife law en-
forcement actions are the subject of Section C.
A. Unconstitutionality by Assimilation
The Lacey Act prohibits, inter alia, importation and transportation of
"any wildlife taken, transported, or sold in any manner in violation of
any law or regulation of any State or foreign country." 331 Defendants in
United States v. Molt332 were charged with conspiracy to smuggle snakes
into the United States in violation of Fijian and Papuan law. They moved
to dismiss the indictment on the creative ground that the Lacey Act is un-
constitutional because the foreign laws it assimilates might be
unconstitutional if enacted here. The district court began with the propo-
sition that "the mere fact that a foreign law could prove unconstitutional
does not in and of itself provide a sufficient basis for invalidating the stat-
ute,"-333 but avoided just that question by holding that the foreign laws
concededly violated were not the type of laws intended to be assimilated.
The Fijian law was simply a revenue measure: no Fijian statute prohibited
the exportation of any wildlife. In spite of testimony by an Australian fed-
eral judge that the Papua New Guinea law was intended for the protection
of wildlife, the court held that it too was only a revenue law. 334 On
331. 18 U.S.C. §43(a)(2) (1976).
332. 452 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Pa. 1978), rev'd in part, 599 F.2d 1217 (3d Cir. 1979).
333. 452 F. Supp. at 1203 (emphasis omitted).
334. Id. at 1205-06.
Vol. 55:295, 1980
Wildlife and the Constitution
appeal, the holding as to the latter law was reversed and the prosecution
reinstated. 335 The constitutional assimilation contention was summarily
rejected:
Defendants' objections to the constitutionality of the Lacey Act . .. are
patently frivolous. The Act does not delegate legislative power to foreign
governments, but simply limits the exclusion from the stream of foreign
commerce to wildlife unlawfully taken abroad. The illegal taking is simply
a fact entering into the description of the contraband article. . . . Congress
could obviously exercise its plenary power over foreign commerce in such a
manner if it so chose. 336
The Supreme Court has upheld assimilation of prospective as well as
present state law into federal law, 337 but Molt may be a case of first im-
pression. Although the result appears unexceptional, the holding is im-
portant in that other federal wildlife laws, notably the ESA, also rely on
foreign law to define the offense.
338
B. Illegal Sale of an Artifact Legally Acquired
In the changeover from no regulation to a system intended to preserve
certain species, some interests are caught in the middle. Obviously, one
of the most effective ways to reduce poaching for profit is to remove the
market for the species taken. Every major federal wildlife statute follows
and goes beyond that maxim by forbidding the possession, sale, and
transportation as well as the taking or harassment of the species protected.
Congress sometimes made provision for preexisting interests, but some-
times it did not. When no distinction was made between wildlife acquired
before and after the effective date of the new regime, the question arises
whether Congress constitutionally can make a crime out of the possession
or sale of a wildlife artifact that was acquired legally. The problem is one
of considerable practical importance because it is frequently difficult to
distinguish between new and old artifacts such as feathers, hides, and
scrimshaw. If the government must prove the date of taking as well as the
fact of sale, enforcement will be greatly impeded. A review of prior cases
will assist in analyzing the issues in a pending case soon to be decided by
the Supreme Court.339
335. 599F.2dat 1219-20.
336. Id. at 1219 n.l.
337. United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958).
338. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1976).
339. The case was decided while this article was being prepared for publication. Andrus v. Al-
lard, 48 U.S.L.W. 4013 (Nov. 27, 1979). See notes 380-97 and accompanying text infra.
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The issue arose in a trio of district court decisions shortly after passage
of the MBTA in 1918. In United States v. Fuld Store Co., 340 the informa-
tion charged the attempted sale of heron plumage acquired before passage
of the Act. The MBTA simply stated that "it shall be unlawful .. to
. . . possess, offer for sale, [or] sell" any migratory bird or part
thereof. 341 The court dismissed the information, holding that the Act
could only apply prospectively; this was "perhaps the only construction
which [would] sanction the act's validity." 342 The court opined that an
attempt by Congress "to virtually outlaw and destroy such property"
would contravene the fifth amendment as an uncompensated taking and
might be "an ex post facto law within constitutional inhibition." 343 Al-
though possession of game in the closed season that was acquired legally
in the open season concededly was an offense under state law, the court
rejected the analogy because the latter offense was "subject to a known
condition." 344 Two years later, in 1922, the same judge demonstrated al-
most total contempt for federal migratory bird regulation by dismissing
sua sponte a series of MBTA informations, including the alleged offenses
of selling, offering to sell, and hunting after sunset. 345 In that instance,
the court extended Fuld Store by holding that the information had to ne-
gate the possibility of prior acquisition, even though the facts indicated
that at least one specimen was initially "fresh.'"346 The "rule" of these
cases was followed in United States v. Marks347 in 1925.
Because these antediluvian interpretations are still cited as
controlling, 348 further comments are in order. First, all three opinions re-
flected a prevailing philosophy that is inconsistent with the MBTA's phi-
losophy and with contemporary theory. History has finally taught us-at
least some of us-that no natural resource is infinite. Wildlife laws are
now being taken seriously by the general populace as well as by Con-
gress. Second, the rationale of Fuld Store-that Congress could not
forbid commerce in an object legally acquired, and therefore Congress
would not have meant to do so-is questionable and reverses the proper
340. 262 F. 836 (D. Mont. 1920).
341. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1976).
342. 262 F. at 837.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 838.
345. In re Informations Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 281 F. 546 (D. Mont. 1922). The
informations were described as involving "unintentional and trifling infractions" which should have
been ignored by any prosecutor " 'who knows his business.' " Id. at 549. The judge's other com-
ments were less kind.
346. A taxidermist allegedly received a bird for mounting which he "retained for a few days,
until it spoiled and was thrown away." Id. at 548.
347. 4 F.2d 420 (S.D. Tex. 1925).
348. See the discussion of Allard at text accompanying notes 380-97 infra.
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approach to the problem.349 Third, the latter two cases did not necessarily
follow from the first. It is a different thing to say that possession of arti-
facts known to be pre-existing is not criminal than it is to require the gov-
ernment to negate the possibility of legal acquisition. Finally, the cases
did not distinguish between possession and sale. There matters rested for
a half century.
The inclusion of raptors within the protection of the MBTA in 1972350
set the stage for several recent cases concerning the application of the Act
to wildlife products which may have been acquired legally. In United
States v. Blanket,351 defendant was charged with selling fans made from
hawk feathers, and he asserted that the information was deficient because
it did not allege the date of taking. The Oklahoma federal district court
declined to follow the Fuld Store line of cases. 352 It held that prosecutors
do not have to negate possible defenses in the charge, and that the con-
trary rule would severely weaken the Act by its impracticality. 353 Signifi-
cantly, the court went further in dictum: "Assuming that possession prior
to the effective date of the Act is a defense against selling after the effec-
tive date of the Act (and the Court is not satisfied that this is necessarily
so) such would certainly be defensive." 354 As defendant did not prove
349. The Fuld approach is reminiscent of The Abby Dodge. See notes 97-104 and accompanying
text supra. Like Chief Justice White, the author of Abby Dodge, the Fuld court started from a
questionable conclusion that the MBTA did not apply retrospectively. The court then avoided what
should have been the first question-what did Congress intend?-on the basis of the conclusion.
350. The original treaty with Canada, Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug.
16, 1916, United States-Great Britain, 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628, was later supplemented by trea-
ties with Mexico, Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, Feb. 7,
1936, United States-Mexico, 50 Stat. 1311, T.S. No. 912, and with Japan, Convention for the Pro-
tection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their Environment, Mar. 4, 1972,
United States-Japan, 25 U.S.T. 3329, T.I.A.S. No. 7990. Accordingly, the original Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, ch. 128, § 2, 40 Stat. 755 (1918), was amended to protect all birds listed under the
subsequent treaties, ch. 634, § 3, 49 Stat. 1556 (1936); Pub. L. No. 93-300, § 1, 88 Stat. 190
(1974). The relevant section of the Act, as amended, now appears at 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1976). An-
other amendment will be required to add implementation of the recently ratified migratory bird treaty
with Russia. See Comment, Migratory Bird Treaty With Russia: Continued International Wildlife
Protection, 7 ENVT'L L. REP. 10026 (1977).
Raptors are hawks, owls, and eagles, predatory carnivores for whom open seasons have been com-
mon through most of our history. But, pursuant to the authority of Article IV of the 1936 Mexican
Convention as delegated to the Secretary of the Interior, the two governments by an exchange of
notes on March 20, 1972 agreed to an expanded list of protected species, including raptors. See M.
BEAN, supra note 27, at 70 n. 12. The list is at 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (1978).
351. 391 F. Supp. 15 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
352. Id.
353. Id. at 17-18. " 'Practically speaking, it would foreclose prosecution in most cases...
since rarely would [the taking information] be available to the prosecution. The source of the feathers
sold by the accused would ordinarily be . . .peculiarly within his knowledge.' "Id. at 19 n. I (quot-
ing Fippin v. United States, 162 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1947)).
354. Id. at 19 n.1 (emphasis added).
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legal acquisition, neither the constitutional nor the statutory question was
reached, and the conviction was affirmed. Blanket was followed in
United States v. Hanel,355 a prosecution of a taxidermist for offering to
sell a recently protected stuffed snowy owl. The ultimate question-
whether criminality could attach to sales of legally acquired artifacts-
again was not reached. The Ninth Circuit did, however, disavow Fuld
Store and company. 3
56
In Delbay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Commerce,357 the
District Court for the District of Columbia did reach this issue, and
upheld the application of the Endangered Species Act to legally acquired
products. Plantiff's assignor had acquired a large stock of spermaceti. a
whale product, under federal permit. 35 8 Thereafter, the new Endangered
Species Act of 1973 outlawed all commerce in products from listed spe-
cies. 359 The Department of Commerce seized not only the raw stock but
also the commercial preparation into which it had been manufactured. 3611
Plaintiff's suit for its recovery alleged due process violations and general
arbitrariness. The court disposed of the contentions almost summarily. It
held that the import permit granted a right to import and no more; 361 legal
acquisition under permit gives no uncontrovertible right to possess or
sell; 362 Congress could rationally have believed that live species could be
fully protected only by a total ban on commerce in their products, -363 the
Act's operation is not retroactive because only post-enactment activities
were involved; 364 enforcement difficulties of a contrary holding make the
ban a rational choice of means;365 and the court must defer to that legisla-
355. 534 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1976).
356. Id. at 1356.
357. 409 F. Supp. 637 (D.D.C. 1976).
358. The "economic hardship" permit had been issued pursuant to section 3(b) of the
Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (repealed 1973).
Under the permit, which was in effect for ten months in 1971, another company had imported several
thousand tons of sperm whale oil, some of which was sold to plaintiff in 1974 and 1975. 409 F. Supp
at 640.
359. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(A), (E), (F) (1976). The sperm whale had been listed as endan-
gered since 1970.35 Fed. Reg. 18,319 (1970) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1978)).
360. The manufactured product was worth an estimated $1.5 million. 409 F. Supp. at 640-41.
361. Id. at 641, 643. "If this were not the case, then one importing spermaceti pursuant to a
hardship exemption would be placed in a superior position to one who had lawfully imported sperma-
ceti prior to the enactment of the 1969 Act. This certainly was not the intent of Congress. " Id. at 641.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 642, 644. The court noted that there is difficulty in distinguishing between "legal"
and "'illegal" spermaceti, and that for enforcement purposes, "[a] total ban is easier to enforce than a
partial ban." Id. at 642. The enforcement difficulty of course leads to increased illegal taking by
assisting in the maintenance of a market for goods made from threatened species. This rationale ac-
cords with Blanket, Hamel, and Richards.
364. 409 F. Supp. at 642.
365. See note 363 supra.
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tive choice.3 66 The court concluded that due process was not violated:
"Since the beginning of this century, the Supreme Court, with few ex-
ceptions since overruled, has consistently upheld the power of Congress
under the Commerce Clause to exclude from the channels of interstate
commerce those products whose movements between the states the Con-
gress deems harmful to the national welfare." 367 The court also indicated
that the prohibition on sale would extend to one who imported the product
prior to the institution of permit requirements. 368 Finally, in response to
plaintiff's contention that the Act constituted an uncompensated taking,
the court merely responded in a footnote that if such were the case, plain-
tiff could seek compensation in the Court of Claims. 369 Following the
Delbay decision, Congress amended the ESA to authorize economic
hardship permits for disposition of pre-Act scrimshaw and whale oil.
370
Raptors again became the subject of controversy in United States v.
Richards,371 the most recent case to consider this issue. Since 1966 the
Fish and Wildlife Service has attempted to regulate ordinarily wild birds
raised in captivity. 372 Richards was "a college professor of good reputa-
tion and high community standing" 373 who acquired sparrow hawks le-
gally and raised their offspring in captivity for falconry. 374 Richards was
warned but chose to test regulations promulgated under the MBTA by
selling the young. 375 He was convicted of three counts of violating the
MBTA and harshly sentenced. 376 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit dealt
mostly with definitions and questions of congressional intent. 377 The
court also held, however, that the acquisition of the parents under a state
366. 409 F. Supp. at 644.
367. Id. at 643-44 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Hipolite Egg. Co. v.
United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911); and Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902)). The court also
found a close analogy in Century Arms, Inc. v. Kennedy, 323 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Vt.), affd, 449
F.2d 1306 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972). 409 F. Supp. at 644-45 n.2.
368. 409 F. Supp. at 641,643.
369. Id. at 645 n.3.
370. Pub. L. No. 94-359, §§ 2, 3, 90 Stat. 911 (1976) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1539) (Supp.
1978)).
371. 583 F.2d491 (10thCir. 1978).
372. 31 Fed. Reg. 11231 (1966) (amending 50 C.F.R. § 12.12 (1965)).
373. 583 F.2d at 497.
374. Id. at 493-94.
375. Id. at 493.
376. Id.
377. The court rejected defendant's contention that only "wild" birds were protected by the Act
by noting that the language of the Act referred to "migratory" birds. That captive birds do not mi-
grate was seen as "immaterial" since "[tihe question is whether the [birds] ... sold belong to a
species or group that migrate, not whether the particular birds migrate." 583 F.2d at 494-95. Be-
cause the Act specifically authorized the promulgation of regulations governing "when ... if at all,
and by what means" birds could be sold or purchased, 16 U.S.C. § 704 (1976), and because neither
the Act nor the relevant congressional committee reports made mention of captive nongame birds,
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permit for scientific purposes did not create a property right such that the
later prohibition on sale of offspring unconstitutionally deprived defen-
dant of property. 378 Implicit in the court's affirmance was the holding that
Congress could-and did-make criminal the sale of a legally acquired
wildlife specimen. The dissent did not question the power of Congress
but contended the majority misread intention. 379
The taking issue became critical in Allard v. Andrus.380 Persons own-
ing and dealing in American Indian artifacts originally sought invalida-
tion of the Migratory Bird and Bald Eagle Acts, 38' but, by the time of
decision in 1978, their contention had narrowed to a claim that "the
defendants' [Fish and Wildlife Service officers] application of these stat-
utes and regulations to preexisting artifacts restricts their ability to engage
in lawful occupation and destroys a valuable property right all in violation
of the constitutional guaranty of due process.''382 The regulations in
question allowed the possession and transportation of such artifacts with-
out a federal permit, but outlawed any sale or other commercial transac-
little weight was granted to certain remarks made during congressional debate on the Act suggesting
that protection of captive birds was not intended. 583 F.2d at 494-95. The court considered it unim-
portant that for fifty years the administrative regulations had not protected captive birds, since
"[non-exercise of a granted power does not destroy the grant of that power." Id. at 495. And. the
regulations were deemed reasonable because the difficulty in distinguishing captive-raised birds from
others of the same species would, as a practical matter, render enforcement of the Act difficult if the
defense were available that the birds involved were raised in captivity. Id. See Coggins & Patti. supra
note 320, at 178-79.
378. Noting that the state permits authorized possession or sale only under certain conditions, the
court declared that "[alt the most, the states granted a partial property interest which did not encom-
pass all usual property rights." 583 F.2d at 496. The court "rejected defendant's claims of unconsti-
tutional deprivation of property." Id.
379. Id. at 497-501 (Logan, J., dissenting). Allard v. Andrus had been decided by a district
court in Colorado. The Tenth Circuit recognized the possible conflicts between the decisions. By
deciding that the state permits granted only "permissive possession," not "real" ownership (even
though the Utah permit authorized sale of the young under certain circumstances), the court was able
to deny that Richards had any property right capable of being deprived by the prohibition on sale. Id.
at 496. The constitutional cornerstone of Allard was thus irrelevant in Richards. Allard's holding that
Congress did not intend the MBTA to apply to pre-acquired items was distinguished on the ground
that the items of sale in Richards were live birds, not artifacts, which had not been "possessed" prior
to the effective date of protection. Id. But Richards cited Blanket and Hamel in rejecting the Fuld
Store line of cases on which Allard relied, and on the critical issue-whether Congress can forbid the
sale of a legally acquired wildlife specimen or artifact-the cases appear to reach opposite conclu-
sions. Whether such a prohibition exceeds congressional power because it violates the fifth
amendment's due process clause as an uncompensated taking is the question that the Supreme Court
will have to answer.
380. Civ. No. 75-W-1000 (D. Colo., June 7, 1978), rev'd, 48 U.S.L.W. 4013 (Nov. 27.
1979). The decision below has not been reported officially. References to that decision are cited to
the page numbers in the unreported decision [hereinafter cited as Opin. 1.
381. Allard v. Frizzell, 536 F.2d 1332, 1334 n.l (10th Cir. 1976) (preliminary procedural deci-
sion).
382. Opin., supra note 380, at 2.
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tion. 383 The three-judge panel started with the proposition that: "[the ap-
plication of these acts to the plaintiff's artifacts has a destructive and
confiscatory effect on preexisting property rights in these items. The
questioned regulations have destroyed the right to sell them." 384
The Bald Eagle Act allows possession and transportation of pre-1940
bird parts without explicitly forbidding their sale. 385 The MBTA contains
very sweeping prohibitory language but does not deal with preexisting ar-
tifacts per se. 386 The court seized upon the congressional silence to inter-
pret both statutes narrowly, thereby circumventing the "grave doubts"
about their constitutionality. 387 The regulations were invalidated as being
ultra vires and "violative of the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment property
rights.'' 388
In interpreting the statutes, however, the court did not attempt a de-
tailed analysis of statutory language or legislative intent. Instead, it noted
that game birds are more numerous than endangered species. 389 In an at-
tempt to distinguish Delbay, it found no indication that the statutes were
"to be enforced 'in the broadest possible terms.' "390 The court also re-
lied upon three cases decided between 1920 and 1925,391 and on an
unreported Tenth Circuit case.392 Ironically, the court seemed unaware of
the recent cases that have distinguished or rejected the earlier deci-
sions. 393 Other legislation for dealing with preexisting artifacts 394 was
compared with the statutes and regulations at issue. But had the panel
383. 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.2(a), 22.2 (1978).
384. Opin., supra note 380, at4.
385. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1976).
386. Unless permitted by regulation promulgated pursuant to id. at § 704, the Act flatly forbids
the hunting, killing, sale or transportation "at any time, by any means or in any manner" of "any
migratory bird, [or] any part." Id. at § 703.
387. Opin., supra note 380, at 10. The panel also made the rather dubious assumption that Con-
gress was aware and approved of the shallow Fud Store opinion when it later amended the Act. Id.
388. Id. atll.
389. This irrelevant reversion to the mentality exhibited by the court in the dismissal of the
MBTA informations, see notes 345-46 and accompanying text supra, was not cured by the court's
further preoccupation with the blackbird roosting problem. Opin., supra note 380, at 12. Blackbirds
were the subject of Society of Animal Rights v. Schlesinger, 512 F. 2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
390. Opin., supra note 380, at 7. See also 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1976), reproduced in relevant part
note 386 supra.
391. See notes 340-49 supra.
392. United States v. Aitson, No. 74-1588 (10th Cir., July 21, 1975). The rationale for the
court's reliance on this case is unknown.
393. See notes 351, 355 supra. It is ironic because public interest groups who would have alerted
the court to those cases and the new direction of the law were not allowed to intervene in the suit.
Allard v. Frizzell, 536 F.2d 1332 (10th Cir. 1976.)
394. The court inaccurately characterized the 1976 Amendments to the ESA, Pub. L. No.
94-359, 90 Stat. 911 (1976) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(f) (1976)), as "providing a three-year
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read the statutes more thoroughly, its conviction might have been less un-
ambiguous.395
On the constitutional issue, the three-judge panel acknowledged that
Congress has broad power to exclude things from interstate commerce,
but asserted, as the cornerstone of its holding, that there is an implicit
limitation on that power:
We would submit, however, that the Supreme Court has never upheld the
power of Congress to deprive a person forever of the right to dispose of his
private property through commercial channels where such property was le-
gally acquired-in contravention of no public policy-and where the prop-
erty is not only harmless in itself, but also has intrinsic value. 3 96
That, of course, is the question; whether it is also the conclusion awaits
the Supreme Court's disposition. 397
Even with the shortcomings of the panel opinion, it still cannot be
asserted with assurance that the result is entirely wrong. Artifacts dealers
do have a legitimate interest in their livelihood, an interest entitled to
more protection than, for example, the privilege of sport hunting. 398 The
regulations at issue do not "destroy" plaintiffs' occupations, but they do
make them more restricted and difficult. Congress possibly did not intend
to impose such hardship, although in the case of both the Bald Eagle Act
and the MBTA Congress was reacting to a situation in which it deemed
radical, sweeping remedies to be just as necessary as in the case of the
ESA. 399 Thus, the narrow interpretation is the easy solution, but this path
is taken at the expense of diluting the protection of birds-a task onerous
enough without further judically imposed constraints. As a constitutional
matter, the question posed as a conclusion by the court still remains: can
Congress forbid the sale of an otherwise inoffensive item that was legally
exemption allowing pre-Act scrimshaw and sperm whale oil ... to be sold commercially." Opin..
supra note 380, at 9. In fact, the Amendments provide that the Secretary "may exempt" these prod-
ucts, but only if an application for exemption is made within one year of the effective date of applica-
ble regulations that the Secretary is directed to prescribe, and only if that application contains a com-
plete and detailed inventory of all products for which exemption is sought. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1539(f)(2).
(3)(A), (B). The regulations pertaining to these exemptions were promulgated on June 2, 1977. 42
Fed. Reg. 28, 139 (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 222-1.28 (1978)), and provide that all applications for
exemptions must have been received by August 18, 1977. 50 C.F.R. § 222.11-2(d) (1978). The
court also noted that regulations under the MMPA exempt pre-Act animals, 50 C.F.R. § 18.25,
without also noting that, by its terms, the only MMPA prohibitions against possession or sale of
marine mammals extend merely to animals "taken" in violation of the Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(3).
395. See notes 386, 394 supra.
396. Opin., supra note 380, at 8.
397. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed Allard while this article was being prepared for
publication. Andrus v. Allard, 48 U.S. L.W. 4013 (Nov. 27, 1979).
398. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
399. E.g., TREFETHAN, supra note 67, at 149-54.
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acquired? While the wisdom of such a course is debatable, the authorities
indicate that Congress does have the power to do so.
C. Hunting and Vagueness, Killing and Scienter
Among the federal species statutes, only the MBTA is of sufficient an-
tiquity for a sizable body of judicial interpretation to have grown up
around it. That law has evolved to the point where two related constitu-
tional questions are now coming into focus, both of which stem from the
long line of authority holding that no scienter or guilty intent need be
shown to prove a violation of the MBTA. 400 More comprehensive hunt-
ing regulations of recent vintage have inspired contentions, so far unsuc-
cessful, that the regulations are so vague that no sufficient notice of crimi-
nal liability is given. 401 Federal prosecutors have also been successful in
convicting business entities of negligent and even accidental activities
causing bird mortality. 4° 2 Constitutional questions have not been litigated
in these latter cases, but possible future extensions of the doctrine will
lead inevitably to constitutional attack.
Since 1938 Fish and Wildlife Service regulations have made it illegal
to hunt game birds over a "baited" area. 40 3 The regulations and a judicial
temporal extension have been repeatedly upheld, even when the defen-
dant is not shown to have had knowledge of the bait. 404 In 1972, the regu-
lations were amended to prohibit hunting over the area for at least ten
days after the "complete removal" of the bait. 405 In United States v. Jar-
man,406 defendants were convicted of hunting over an area from which
the bait had been removed several days before. They contended on appeal
that the baiting regulations were unconstitutionally vague. "In particular
they assert that enforcement of the new provision deprives them of liberty
and property without due process in violation of the 14th Amendment
since it cannot be determined with any degree of certainty what consti-
tutes 'complete removal' of the bait." '40 7 Noting that the 1972 change
400. United States v. Reese, 27 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Tenn. 1939). See M. BEAN, supra note 27,
at 76-85; Coggins & Patti, supra note 320, at 183-89; Margolin, Liability Under the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 9 ECOLOGY L. Q. 789 (1979).
401. United States v. Jamon, 491 F. 2d 746 (4th Cir. 1974).
402. United States v. FMC Corporation, 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
403. Pres. Proc. No. 2245, Reg. 3 (July 26, 1937), 2 Fed. Reg. 1355 (1937) (current version
codified at 50 C. F. R. § 20.21(i) (1978).
404. E.g., Rogers v. United States, 367 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1966); Koop v. United States, 296
F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1961); United States v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Ky. 1939).
405. 37 Fed. Reg. 13,472 (1972).
406. 491 F.2d 764(4th Cir. 1974).
407. Id. at 766.
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made the regulation more precise than its predecessor, the court rejected
the contention. 408
In United States v. Delahoussave,40 9 defendants had been hunting from
a duck blind about 300 yards from bait and decoys. They were convicted
of hunting in a "baited area" and in an area benefitting from the presence
of live decoys of which they knew "or should have known.' '410 They
contended on appeal that the phrases describing the area were overly
vague, especially in combination with the "should have known" stan-
dard. The Fifth Circuit, while recognizing that the areas as defined were
not geographically precise, as they could expand or contract with wind or
weather, affirmed the convictions. 411 A possibly conflicting 1961 deci-
sion 412 was distinguished. The court also held that the regulation was nec-
essary for enforcement, sufficiently precise, and would make the
"hunters resist the temptation to sail close to the wind." 413
In neither instance was a good case made that defendants were truly
ignorant of the circumstances or without any guilty knowledge. Neverthe-
less, it is quite possible that a hunter who believes he is following the law
and regulations to the letter can be punished as a criminal: Jarman recog-
nized this possibility, but stated that "even an unknowing violation will
support a conviction." 414 This departure from the normal rules for crimi-
nal liability arises because MBTA violations are treated as "public
welfare" offenses. Under the Morissette4t 5 rationale, in order to promote
a social aim, some innocent but malum prohibitum activities are punish-
able if no stigma is attached and the penalty is mild. In the case of MBTA
regulations, the prevailing philosophy seems to be that the hunter essen-
408. The court declared that the 1972 amendment did not change the "basic proviso" of the
regulations, "but only defined precisely in terms of days the extended period during which an area is
regarded as baited," id. at 766, adding that the changes were not "'as startling an innovation as the
defendants would have us believe. Courts had interpreted the original regulation to hold that the at-
traction of bait remains even after complete removal." Id. at 766 n.3 (citation omitted).
409. 573 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978).
410. Id.at9l2;50C.F.R.§20.21(f),(i)(1978).
411. 573 F.2d at 912.
412. In United States v. Oleson, 196 F. Supp. 688, 690-91 (S.D. Cal. 1961), the court held that
the "baited area" extended only as far as 200 yards from the bait, finding a state r gulation to that
effect controlling. The Delahoussaye court found no parallel here and further indicated that the fed-
eral regulation would control in any event. 573 F.2d at 913.
413. 573F.2dat912.
414. 491 F.2d at 766.
415. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252-61 (1952). The Court in Morissette read a
scienter requirement into a federal conversion statute, but it contrasted that statute with regulations
creating "public welfare offenses" that did not readily fit "accepted classifications of common-law
offenses." In the latter, "penalties commonly are relatively small, and conviction does no grave
damage to an offender's reputation." Such regulations do not require a showing of criminal intent.
id. at 255-56. Cf. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258
U.S. 250 (1922).
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tially assumes the risk of violation, given the knowledge that hunting is
an easily revocable and often abused privilege. And, in fact, the reported
cases indicate that defenses based on lack of guilty intent are more often
post hoc technical ploys to force the government to prove state of mind
rather than good faith professions of mental innocence. 416
In the other and more recent line of cases, the courts have imposed
criminal liability under the MBTA despite the prosecutor's concession
that there was no intent to kill. 417 Three unreported decisions upheld con-
victions of oil companies for maintaining uncovered oil pits in which wa-
ter fowl became fouled and died.418 In United States v. Corbin Farm Ser-
vice,419 defendant were accused of killing migratory birds by negligently
spraying a dangerous pesticide. The court held that no intent to kill was
required for conviction. The Second Circuit in United States v. FMC Cor-
poration420 affirmed the conviction of a pesticide manufacturer who had
accidentally discharged lethal wastewater into a pond frequented by
birds, cauiing the death of many in spite of defendant's efforts to rectify
the situation. 421 The FMC court imposed strict criminal liability premised
in part on the ultrahazardous nature of defendant's business. 422 These
cases are logical outcomes of the very broad language of the MBTA423
and are logical extensions of the "no scienter" concept in "public wel-
fare" cases. Yet because they create an open-ended criminal liability and
without giving any indication of the outer boundaries of the offense,424
future applications may be subject to constitutional attack. For whatever
the circumstances, our system has not before countenanced criminal lia-
bility for an unlimited range of innocent acts, either negligently under-
taken or with accidental consequences. Perhaps, in this and other areas of
416. Delahoussaye is an example: From the facts given in the opinion it appeared that defendants
could hardly have been completely unaware of bait and decoys. 573 F.2d at 912.
417. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 320.
418. United States v. Equity Corp., Cr. No. 75-51 (D. Utah, Dec. 8, 1975); United States v.
Stuarco Oil Co., No. 73-CR-129 (D. Colo., Aug. 17, 1973); United States v. Union Tex. Pe-
troleum, No. 73-CR-127 (D. Colo., July 11, 1973). See Coggins & Patti, supra note 320, at
183-84.
419. 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal.), aff 'd, 578 F.2d 259(9th Cir. 1978).
420. 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
421. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 320, at 185-90 (discussion of United States v. FMC Cor-
poration).
422. After an extensive discussion of strict liability doctrines in tort law for ultra-hazardous ac-
tivities, the court declared that -FMC engaged in an activity involving the manufacture of a highly
toxic chemical; and FMC failed to prevent this chemical from escaping into the pond and killing
birds. This is sufficient to impose strict liability on FMC." 572 F.2d at 908.
423. The Act forbids killing "by any means or in any manner," 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1976), and
exempts only taking pursuant to federal permit or regulation. Id. at § 704.
424. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 320, at 190. See also Margolin, supra note 400; Comment,
36 WASH. &LEEL. REv. 241 (1979).
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human conduct, the availablity of criminal punishment for all but very
careful means of operation would be a worthwhile deterrent, but whether
it squares with our constitutional history is questionable.
The MBTA cases take on added significance because their rationale
can be extended into enforcement of the other federal wildlife statutes
whose penalties are far more severe. 425 In the case of endangered species,
for instance, a regulation makes any human activity that "significantly
disrupts" the behavior of a listed species subject to prosecution as a pro-
hibited "taking. "426 It may be that the potential harshness and vagueness
of such rules will be ameliorated by prosecutorial and judicial "common
sense" lawmaking in future instances, but courts must confine as well as
define the prohibited behavior. 427
Whether or not federal wildlife law constitutionally may assimilate
foreign law, make criminal the sale of a legally acquired artifact, or pun-
ish an act done without guilty intent, the validity of the underlying federal
regulatory structure in general will not be affected. Assuming that valid-
ity, the effect of federal law on state law should be examined.
V. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE WILDLIFE LAW
Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, 428 a
state law or regulation is preempted if it is inconsistent with a federal law
or if it is in a field which federal law was intended to occupy exclu-
sively.429 Delineating the scope of preemption in the area of wildlife law
will continue to pose difficult problems in the foreseeable future, because
425. But see United States v. FMC, 572 F.2d at 908 (strict liability upheld in part due to mild
penalties).
426. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1978). The Fish and Wildlife Service's interpretation of this statute con-
tained in the regulation has been criticized, but it appears to have been accepted by the Court in TVA
v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184-85 n.30 (1978). See Coggins & Patti, supra note 320, at 194-95. A civil
injunction premised on violation of the ESA and implementing regulation was entered in Palila v.
Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979).
427. One possible solution is proffered in Coggins & Patti, supra note 320, at 192;
It is suggested, therefore, that for an act to be deemed a criminal violation under the MBTA. it
must be purposeful (that is, the act must be intended, though not necessarily the consequences).
it must involve a potentially lethal (to birds) agent (poisons, oil, pesticides. chain saws, guns,
power lines, traps, fire, etc.); there must be some degree of "culpability" in the action: and the
consequences for bird mortality must be generally foreseeable should the operation go astray
through negligence or accident.
428. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
429. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976); cf., e.g., Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
The impact of the commerce clause on state laws should be distinguished from that of the
supremacy clause. The Oklahoma statute at issue in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), for
instance, was invalidated not because of congressional action preempting it, but because it burdened
interstate commerce. See Part I-C supra.
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the federal statutes contemplate a large implementation and enforcement
role for the states.430 For analytical purposes, the controversial areas can
be divided into commerce regulation, regulation of taking and commerce
in wildlife by Native American Indians, public land management, and di-
rect species protection. Preemption lawsuits over wildlife regulation have
increased considerably in recent years, and, as doubts about the validity
of federal regulation are overborne, even more litigation is probable.
A. Preemption of State Laws Regulating Commerce in Wildlife
Four state laws that imposed commercial prohibitions beyond federal
restrictions have been attacked on the ground of asserted federal preemp-
tion. Although New York laws were upheld while those of Maryland and
California were invalidated, the decisions431 are essentially consistent
when the differing circumstances are considered.
The Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969432 prohibited the
importation of species listed as endangered, but contained neither a
preemption nor a saving clause. 433 New York, in the Mason434 and Har-
ris435 Acts, prohibited the importation, sale, or possession with intent to
sell of not only the federally listed species but also additional species.436
Challenges to the New York statutes in state and federal courts failed on
all counts. In A.E. Nettleton Company v. Diamond,437 the plaintiff, a
reptile hide renderer, contended that the Mason Law violated the supre-
macy clause. Conceding that the federal act was "a piece of comprehen-
430. E.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 709a (MBTA), 1333, 1336 (WF-RHBA), 1379 (MMPA), 1535,
1540(e)(1) (ESA) (1976).
431. Fouke Co. v. Brown, 463 F. Supp. 1142 (E.D. Cal. 1979); Fouke Co. v. Mandel, 386 F.
Supp. 1341 (D. Md. 1974); Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd
per curiam, 440 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 983 (1971); A.E. Nettleton Co. v.
Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182, 264 N.E.2d 118, 315 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1970), appeal denied sub nom.
Reptile Prod. Ass'nv. Diamond, 401 U.S. 969 (1971).
432. Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 168aa-cc (1970) and repealed
1973).
433. The inadequacies of the 1969 legislation are described in Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Re-
sources: An Overview of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 N.D.L. Rev. 315, 317-18 (1974).
See also Palmer, Endangered Species Protection: A History of Congressional Action, 4 ENv'r'L A'.
255 (1975).
434. 1970 N.Y. LAws, ch. 1048 (current version at N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW § 11-0536
(McKinney Supp. 1979-80)).
435. 1970 N.Y. LAws, ch. 1047 (current version at N.Y. ENvIR. CONSERV. LAW § 11-0535
(McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1979-80)).
436. New York outlawed sale of all large spotted cat furs, for instance, while just a few of those
species were included on the federal list. See Note, Federal and State Protection Against Commercial
Exploitation of Endangered Wildlife, 17 CAm. LAW. 241 (1971).
437. 27 N.Y.2d 182, 264 N.E.2d 118, 315 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1970), appeal denied sub nom. Rep-
tile Prods. Ass'n v. Diamond, 401 U.S. 969 (1971).
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sive legislation" 438 (which in fact it was not), 439 the New York Court of
Appeals found that there was no real conflict between the two, and that
enforcement of the New York statute would not impair the effectiveness
of the federal act. 440 Looking then to congressional intent, the court could
not locate "the unequivocal intent which is necessary before we can
decree pre-emption." 441 On the contrary, the court found in the Act, in
other federal legislation, and in the regulations, an intention to allow
states to regulate with respect to both indigenous and foreign wildlife. 442
In Padillo, Inc. v. Diamond,443 the same arguments made by a Massa-
chusetts importer of alligator products were deemed by the federal district
court insufficient to raise a substantial federal question. The court
adopted the Nettleton preemption analysis and held that the Interior Sec-
retary's listing of endangered species did not limit or bind the state. 4 4
Thereafter Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA), and the 1973 Endangered Species Act, each of which con-
tained language relevant to preemption. The MMPA expressly voids state
laws regulating the taking of marine mammals-with a provision allow-
ing the states to reassume jurisdiction at the discretion of the Secre-
tary445-but is silent on state commercial regulation. The 1973 ESA is
somewhat more specific: it voids state commercial regulation that permits
actions prohibited by federal law or that prohibits "what is authorized
pursuant to an exemption or permit provided for" by federal law or regu-
lation. 446 Otherwise state conservation regulations shall stand, and states
438. 27 N.Y.2d at 190, 264 N.E.2d at 121, 315 N.Y.S.2d at 630 (footnote omitted).
439. See the authorities cited in notes 433 & 436 supra.
440. 27 N.Y.2d at 190, 264 N.E.2d at 122, 315 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
441. Id. at 191,264 N.E.2d at 122, 315 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
442. The court noted that section 7 of the 1969 Act, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (codified
at 16 U.S.C. § 168aa-cc (1970) and repealed in 1973), makes persons who sell or transport wildlife
or products of wildlife taken or sold in violation of any state or foreign law subject to the Act's en-
forcement provisions, that 16 U.S.C. § 667e (1976) provides that once brought into any state,
products of birds and game animals are subject to state law to the same extent as though the animals
or birds had been produced in the state, and that the regulations promulgated pursuant to the 1969 Act
provide that those regulations " 'shall [not] be construed to relieve any person from any provision of
any other laws, rules, or regulations of the States or the United States.' " 27 N.Y.2d at 191, 264
N.E.2d at 122, 315 N.Y.S.2d at 631 (quoting 35 Fed. Reg. 8,495 (1970)). The court concluded that
Congress intended state laws to continue in effect.
443. 321 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'dper curiam, 440 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied. 404 U.S. 983 (1971).
444. Id. at 634.
445. 16 U.S.C. § 1379(1976).
446. Id. at § 1535(f).
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can prohibit taking not expressly proscribed by federal law. 447 Both stat-
utes contemplate cooperative state-federal implementation programs. 448
The Maryland preemption case arose from a provision in the MMPA
which, in effect, exempts one marine mammal harvest program from its
general moratorium on the taking of or commerce in marine mammals.
Since 1911 the United States has undertaken a harvest of fur seals in the
Pribhilof Islands pursuant to a treaty449 and the Fur Seal Act,450 both of
which were inspired by fears that the seal herds would be wiped out if
open-sea sealing were allowed to continue. Fearing that Japan would re-
commence that practice if the Fur Seal Treaty were renounced, 451
Congress in the MMPA allowed the continuation of the hunt, 452 while
instructing the Secretary of the Interior to determine whether fur seal
populations are at optimal size, and, if not, then through the State Depart-
ment to renegotiate the Treaty. 453 The United States sells the fur seal
skins to the Fouke Company and remits shares of the proceeds to the sig-
natory nations.
A 1973 Maryland statute flatly forbade importation into or sales of
seals within the state, 454 with a few exceptions not here relevant. Fouke's
challenge to the state law was sustained on preemption grounds. 455 The
court held that the statute "frustrate[d] the commercial activity" contem-
plated by the Treaty and the Fur Seal Act,456 and was invalid on those
bases alone. With respect to the MMPA, the court noted the omission of
"importation" from the preemption section, but held that the overall pur-
pose of Congress to develop a unified, integrated management system re-
quired the conclusion "that the absence of a specific congressional intent,
insofar as section 1379 is concerned, to preempt state law does not alter
the fact that. . . importation was, by the very nature of the enactment of
the MMPA, necessarily preempted for federal control.' , 457
The same plaintiff succeeded in voiding a similar California statute five
447. Id. After voiding conflicting state law, the section goes on to state that the Act "shall not
otherwise be construed to void any State law or regulation which is intended to conserve migratory,
resident, or introduced fish or wildlife, or to permit or prohibit sale of such fish or wildlife." Id.
448. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1379 (MMPA), 1535(a)-(e) (ESA) (1976).
449. Treaty for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals, July 7, 1911, 37 Stat. 1542, T.S.
No. 564. Following World War II, the countries renegotiated this treaty. Interim Convention on Con-
servation of North Pacific Fur Seals, Feb. 9, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 2283, T.I.A.S. No. 3948.
450. 16U.S.C. §§ 1151-1187 (1976).
451. S. REP. No. 863, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6 (1972).
452. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(2) (1976).
453. Id. at § 1378(b).
454. MD. NAT. Rrs. CODE ANN. § 10-419 (1974).
455. Fouke Co. v. Mandel, 386 F. Supp. 1341, 1356 (D. Md. 1974).
456. Id.
457. Id. at 1360.
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years later. 458 The American alligator, once listed as an endangered spe-
cies, was downlisted to "threatened" status, 459 which had the effect of
allowing some taking in several Louisiana parishes. The Fouke Company
obtained a federal license to purchase, process, and sell domestically such
alligator hides. Together with a California retailer, Fouke claimed that the
California statute forbidding importation into or sale within the state was
preempted by federal law. The court agreed without extended discussion
or citation. 460
These cases in the aggregate establish little in the way of practical guid-
ance. The New York decisions are easily distinguished from the later
cases because the New York statutes covered species toward which there
was no federal policy, while the Interior Department was actively in-
volved in the regulation of both fur seals and alligators. All three in-
stances can be considered abnormal, for state statutes, if any, more often
provide less protection for the designated species than do the federal stat-
utes. Indeed, that is the very reason for the enactment of the federal
laws. 46 1 The California case was a straightforward application of the fed-
eral statute. The Maryland case perhaps went too far both in attributing an
overriding federal goal of unification to the MMPA while ignoring its
overriding purpose of protection-a purpose arguably served by the
Maryland statute-and in discounting the lack of express legislative de-
termination to preempt or control such an exercise of the state's police
power. 462 In any event, future cases are likely to involve state attempts to
assist rather than retard wildlife commerce, and future arguments might
center on the limits of interstate commerce. Given the plenary federal
power over interstate commerce, it is safe to conclude that federal
preemption of conflicting state commercial statutes is complete except to
the extent that Congress omitted certain species from its protective um-
brella or authorized more restrictive state legislation.
B. Preemption on Indian Reservations and the "Usual and Accustomed
Places"
Both the potential scope of federal preemption and the uncertainties at-
tending its application are evident in the Indian cases. No attempt at a
458. Fouke Co. v. Brown, 463 F. Supp. 1142 (E.D. Cal. 1979).
459. 40 Fed. Reg. 44, 412 (1975) (codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11, 17.42(a) (1978)). The Secre-
tary may by regulation prohibit some or all taking of threatened species. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1976).
460. 463 F. Supp. at 1144.
461. See, e.g., American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Department of the Interior, 551 F.2d 432.
438, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (interpreting the WF-RHBA).
462. Note, Federal Preemption: A New Method for Invalidating State Laws Designed to Protect
Endangered Species?, 47 COLO. L. REv. 261 (1976).
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comprehensive survey or analysis is possible here, 463 but a summary of a
few recent decisions involving Indian treaty beneficiaries who attempted
to void state regulation of their hunting and fishing will demonstrate the
operation of preemption.
Indian treaties, like international treaties, are the supreme law of the
land and override conflicting state laws. 464 Supreme Court resolution of
disputes between states and tribes has exhibited a curious duality. The
treaties most often at issue retain for the Indians the right to hunt and fish
on their reservations and at the "usual and accustomed places.' '465 For a
long time, it was held that states had no regulatory power whatsoever
over Indian practices on the reservation 466 but that states could restrict
some off-reservation practices if necessary for conservation of a particu-
lar wildlife resource. 467 The difference in treatment of the twin rights cre-
ated by the same federal document was never satisfactorily explained, 468
and some argued that all state regulation was necessarily improper.469
The Supreme Court in 1977 resolved the ambiguity the opposite way by
holding that states could impose limitations even on reservation taking if
it threatened to eliminate the resource. 470 In other words, even in the spe-
cial sui generis instance of fish and wildlife exploitation by Indian treaty
beneficiaries, the conservation interest in preserving the resource has
been accorded an importance sufficient to allow limited state infringe-
ment on the federal right.
Where a state oversteps the limits of its confined role, however, the
courts are quick to react in a drastic manner. In the landmark Boldt deci-
sion, 471 the court interpreted the treaty as giving the tribe the right to take
half of the fish run,472 and it retained jurisdiction of the case to ensure that
463. For a general discussion of the effect of federal law on treaty rights, see Wilkinson & Volk-
man, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long As Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon
the Earth,"-Hosv Long a Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601 (1975). See also Coggins &
Modrcin, supra note 3.
464. E.g., Memominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 411 n.12 (1968);
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
465. See Coggins & Modrcin, supra note 3, at 392-95.
466. See Johnson, The States Versus Indian Off-Reservation Fishing: A United States Supreme
Court Error, 47 VASH. L. REv. 207 (1972).
467. See, e.g., Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (Puyallup II); Puyal-
lup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (Puyallup I). However, state regulation could
not discriminate against Indian fishing. See Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44
(1973) (Puyallup II).
468. See Coggins & Modrcin, supra note 3, at 392-95; Johnson, supra note 466.
469. Johnson, supra note 466.
470. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (Puyallup III).
471. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
472. Id. at 343. The statement in the text is an oversimplification of the complex allocation for-
mula eventually chosen.
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the state and private fishermen would abide by its orders. Volatile politi-
cal and legal controversy ensued. The Washington state courts ruled that
the state agencies were without power to implement the federal court
decree,473 which was, according to the Washington Supreme Court, un-
constitutional under the fourteenth amendment. 474 After that decision and
after instances of state and private refusals to abide by the 1974 decree,
Judge Boldt assumed more active supervision of the fishery. He ordered
the state agencies to promulgate conforming regulations and threatened
non-Indian fishermen with contempt charges for non-compliance. 475 On
appeal of a group of such orders, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the angry, beleaguered trial court. 476
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, first considered and generally
affirmed the fish allocation formula 477 worked out by the district court.
He then preceeded to reject with ill-concealed disdain the State's constitu-
tional and preemption arguments.
State-law prohibition against compliance with the District Court's decree
cannot survive the command of the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution. . . . It is also clear that [the state agencies], as parties to this
litigation, may be ordered to prepare a set of rules that will implement the
Court's interpretation of the rights of the parties even if state law withholds
from them the power to do so....
Whether Game and Fisheries may be ordered actually to promulgate reg-
ulations having effect as a matter of state law may well be doubtful. But the
District Court may prescind that problem by assuming direct supervision of
the fisheries if state recalcitrance or state-law barriers should be continued.
...The federal court unquestionably has the power to enter the various
orders that state officials and private parties have chosen to ignore, and even
to displace local enforcement of those orders if necessary to remedy the vio-
lations of federal law found by the court. 478
The Court also held that non-party fishermen were bound by the decree
under any of three theories and were thus subject to contempt proceed-
ings. 479 The dissenting justices, though noting that the trial court was
473. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wn. 2d 677, 565 P.2d 1151 (1977). The court
held that the state Department of Fisheries was authorized "to act for conservation purposes only."
Id. at 682.
474. Washington State Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 89 Wn. 2d 276,
571 P.2d 1373 (1977).
475. 459 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
476. Washington v. Washington State Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 99 S. Ct. 3055
(1979), aff'g, 573 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1978).
477. Id. at 3069-76.
478. Id. at 3079-80 (citations omitted).
479. Id. at 3078 n.32.
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resorting "to the outer limits of its equitable powers," did not dispute the
validity or appropriateness of the remedies chosen.480
In short, it is abundantly clear that the preemptive effect of Indian trea-
ties in conflict with state law is substantial, and that the judicial remedy
may be wide, deep, and severe.
C. Preemption of State Law on Public Lands
Kleppe v. New Mexico reaffirmed the notion that Congress can do
whatever it wishes with wildlife regulation on the federal lands. 481 Con-
gress, however, has not exercised that power to anywhere near its full
extent. The degree of managerial discretion in the federal agencies varies
greatly by system, but in most cases, Congress has directed the agency to
defer to state wildlife law, although the extent of intended deference is
often unclear. 482 The question is academic in most national parks because
hunting is prohibited (although fishing is not).483 Jurisdictional allocation
on the other systems, particularly refuges, national forests, and Bureau of
Land Management lands, however, is seen as a crucial issue by many
state agencies. 484 Before Kleppe, the major federal land management
agencies had reached an informal detente with their state counterparts by
which the state agency had primary authority over hunting and fishing
regulation while the federal agency was responsible for habitat mainte-
nance and enhancement. 485 Whether that agreement could have withstood
challenge in an appropriate case before Kleppe, and whether it can con-
tinue to bind under law, are questions not easily answered.
A typical statute is that governing the management of the National
Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS) by the Fish and Wildlife Service:
The regulations permitting hunting and fishing of resident fish and wildlife
within the System shall be, to the extent practicable, consistent with State
fish and wildlife laws and regulations. The provisions of this Act shall not
be construed as affecting the authority, jurisdiction, or responsibility of the
several States to manage, control, or regulate fish and resident wildlife un-
der State law or regulations in any area within the System. 486
480. Id. at 3085 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting).
481. See notes 171-75 and accompanying text supra.
482. See statutes quoted in text accompanying notes 486 & 489 infra.
483. 16 U.S.C. § 26 (1976) (Yellowstone National Park).
484. See Gottshalk, The Sti. e Federal Partnership in Wildlife Conservation, in WILDLIFE AND
AMERICA, supra note 1, at 290; Note, Regulation of Wildlife in the National Park System: Federal or
State?, 12 NAT. RESOURCE J. 627 (1972). But see Etling, Who Owns the Wildlife?, 3 ENVT'L L. 23
(1970).
485. Gottshalk, supra note 484.
486. Natural Wildlife Refuge Administration Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-669, 80 Stat. 927 (codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(c) (1976)).
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The meaning of this provision :s obscure. Congress obviously did not at-
tempt to define the extent of state "authority, jurisdiction, or responsibil-
ity" in 1966, saying only that if the states had it, they kept it. On the
other hand, the first sentence obviously contemplates that the Secretary
shall have primary responsibility for promulgating taking regulations: He
is to follow state law, but only insofar as it is "practicable" to do so.
States may exercise their police powers on federal lands so long as
Congress has not assumed exclusive legislative jurisdiction or legislated
contrary to state law. 487 In this instance, Congress appears to have given
the Secretary power to override state law in particular instances where
state law is deemed contrary to overriding federal purposes. A more de-
finitive answer must await clarification by Congress or the courts.
The conclusion that federal agencies can (and in some cases must)
override state hunting and fishing law is buttressed by the results of the
Alaska Wolf litigation. The State of Alaska proposed to shoot a large
number of wolves, many on federal lands, in order to increase popula-
tions of caribou, which are prey of wolves. 488 Congress provided in sec-
tion 302(b) of the 1976 Bureau of Land Management Organic Act:
That nothing in this Act should be construed as authorizing the Secretary
... [of Interior or Agriculture] to require Federal permits to hunt and fish on
public lands ...or as enlarging or diminishing the responsibility and au-
thority of the States for management of fish and resident wildlife. However.
the Secretary concerned may designate areas of public land ... where, and
establish periods when, no hunting or fishing will be permitted for reasons
of public safety, administration, or compliance with provisions of appli-
cable law. 4 8 9
In Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus (Alaska Wolf II), plaintiffs sued to halt
the wolf hunt, asserting that the Secretary could not allow it without first
preparing an environmental impact statement (EIS). 490 The Secretary
argued that he was powerless to stop the hunt, and that therefore the prep-
aration of an EIS would be a futile exercise. The court was thus forced to
determine whether section 302(b) empowered the Secretary to stop the
hunt. The District of Columbia District Court, after recounting the legis-
lative history at length, 491 held for plaintiffs: "The administration of the
public lands includes their administration for multiple-use purposes, such
487. E.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
488. Following severe declines in caribou populations, the causes of which were in controversy.
the Alaska agency embarked on the wolf eradication program and limited sport hunting of caribou.
The wolf kill program has been highly controversial and has inspired a series of lawsuits.
489. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1976).
490. Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 9 ERC 2111 (D.D.C. 1977) (mem.) (Alaska Wolf II).
491. Id.at2115-17.
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as wildlife preservation, so that the Secretary can prevent, under certain
circumstances, hunting on federal lands when a multiple use such as wild-
life is seriously threatened.''492 Since the Secretary had the power to
override state law, his failure to exercise it in these exigent circumstances
was ruled a major federal action, which, not being accompanied by an
EIS, would be temporarily enjoined. 493 While the District of Columbia
decision was on appeal, the Secretary "conceded" in a Ninth Circuit case
that he had that power, but successfully argued that his inaction did not
invoke the National Environmental Policy Act.494
The language of the Bureau of Land Management Organic Act is fa-
cially more restrictive of federal discretion than the provisions governing
NWRS management. If the Alaska Wolf II interpretation is sustained, the
federal role dominates in the delicate jurisdictional balance of wildlife
regulation in the major federal lands systems. Even so, the federal land
managers must or should defer to state game regulation where normal
conditions exist.
D. Preemption of Direct Species Protection and Management
The congressional solicitude shown state regulation on federal lands is
not evident in the general federal wildlife species statutes. The designated
species are to be protected at all times, in all places, from all person, and
state management is authorized only insofar as it complies with federal
law and regulations. Kleppe v. New Mexico 495 left open the question
whether the federal government could regulate the taking of wildlife off
federal lands. The Court need not have been so reticent, because Con-
gress clearly has the power to do so under the treaty and commerce
clauses.496 The Court had implicitly sanctioned just such a federal power
two generations before in upholding the MBTA, which governs taking by
all persons, at any time, in any place, and by any means. 497 A long line of
cases under the MBTA and the Bald Eagle Act have affirmed convictions
for taking without distinguishing between the nature of the lands on
which the offense took place. The inquiry must shift from power to inten-
492. Id. at 2117.
493. Id. at 2119-20.
494. Alaska v. Andrus, 591 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1979) (Alaska Wolf III). The Secretary's "con-
cession" came about because the Solicitor General ruled that the Secretary was wrong as a legal
matter. Remarks of Asst. Sec'y of the Department of Interior Herbst, National Wildlife Law and
Policy Conference, Washington, D.C. (May 22, 1978).
495. 426U.S. 529 (1976).
496. See notes 257-81 and accompanying text supra.
497. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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tion: In any given instance, did Congress intend to preclude or override
state law concerning the taking of fish or wildlife?
In the case of each federal species statute, the answer is both yes and
no. Each federal law imposes minimum restrictions that the state law can-
not contravene, 498 but most also allow more restrictive state legislation
and invite state partnership in programs to advance the federal pur-
poses. 499
There are, surprisingly enough, few reported cases where federal
preemption of direct state wildlife regulation on private lands was even
peripherally at issue. The obligation of the federal government to retrieve
wild horses that had strayed onto private lands was litigated in one
case, 500 but the impact of conflicting state requirements, if any, was not
raised. A lawsuit concerning control of wolves, 501 a threatened species,
which were allegedly killing cattle on private lands was decided on the
basis of the legality of the control program under the applicable federal
regulations without mention of state law or preemption. 50 2 In each case,
the court assumed that federal law was supreme and applicable.
In People of Togiak v. United States,50 3 an oblique preemption ques-
tion was raised and decided adversely to both federal and state agencies.
The MMPA contains an express exemption for Alaskan Natives, who
may continue subsistence and handicraft taking of marine mammals so
long as the species is not endangered or depleted. 5°4 The MMPA clearly
preempts state taking regulation as an initial matter, 505 but provides for
retrocession of regulatory jurisdiction to the states, under continuing su-
pervision of the federal agency, if the state laws are "consistent" with the
federal statute and regulations. 50 6 The Interior Department proposed to
return management jurisdiction over nine marine mammal species to the
State of Alaska, 507 and seeing the legal quagmire it was about to enter,
the Department purported to rescind the Native exemption. 50 8 The Alaska
wildlife agency not only would have greatly restricted the otherwise al-
lowable Native taking, but it is also prohibited by the Alaska Constitution
498. See Part IV-A supra.
499. E.g.. 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (1976).
500. Roaring Springs Assoc. v. Andrus, 8 ELR 20696 (D. Ore. 1978) (federal government or-
dered to retrieve the horses).
501. Fund for Animals v. Andrus, 11 ERC 2189 (D. Minn. 1978).
502. The plan invalidated was a cooperative effort among state and federal agencies.
503. 470 F. Supp. 423 (D.D.C. 1979).
504. 16U.S.C. § 1371(b) (1976).
505. Id. at§ 1379(a)(1).
506. Id. at § 1379(a)(2).
507. 41 Fed. Reg. 15,173 (Apr. 9, 1976). See M. BEAN, supra note 27, at 365-68. The initial
proposal was later restricted. 50 C.F.R. § 18.94(a) (1978).
508. 50C.F.R. § 18.94 (a)(l) (1978).
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from making special exemptions and is enjoined by it to manage wildlife
on the "sustained yield principle," 509 itself probably inconsistent with
the MMPA. 510 Certain Natives sued to stop the transfer of jurisdiction
over walrus hunting. It appeared that the court could have granted relief
by reference to "consistency" alone, but Judge Green instead chose
preemption as a ground for invalidating the transfer of jurisdiction: 511
If [the federal statute preempts state jurisdiction], both the regulations pur-
porting to transfer the control of walrus taking to the State of Alaska and the
State's prohibitions on subsistence hunting by Alaskan Natives are of no
effect, for such regulations then improperly contravene the provisions of
section 1371(b) which explicitly and more broadly than the Alaska laws al-
low native hunting. 512
The court then dealt with a series of technical and "convoluted" federal
arguments, and held that the exemption was a substantive requirement
that overrode contrary state law, and could not be circumvented by ob-
scure conceptualizing. 513
An even more fundamental preemption issue was decided in the Palila
case. 514 All of the classic elements were present: The state program re-
flected an intentional choice to accommodate sport hunting as much as
possible, it operated on state lands, and its effect, although not its pur-
pose, was to harm the habitat of a federally protected species. No
commerce was involved, and Hawaii had not entered into a cooperative
agreement for management of endangered species.515 To the court, the
only questions were whether the ESA was valid, whether the state defen-
dants were violating it, and whether they could be sued. All three were
509. At.As. CONs-r. art. VIII, §§ 4, 15, 17.
510. M. BEAN, supra note 27, at 368. Cf. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(6) (1976): "IT]he primary objective
of [marine mammal] management should be to maintain the health and stability of the marine ecosys-
tem. Whenever consistent with this primary objective, it should be the goal to obtain an optimum
sustainable population keeping in mind the optimum carrying capacity of the habitat." On the differ-
ence between sustained yield and optimum sustainable population, see M. BEAN, supra note 27, at
335-42. But see Gaines & Schmidt, Wildlife Population Management Under the Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 1976, 6 ELR 50096 (1976).
511. People ofTogiak v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 423,425 (D.D.C. 1979).
512. Id.
513. The Government argued that the provision exempting Native taking from the provisions of
the Act meant that the state never relinquished control over them because the federal government
never acquired it. The court said that the argument was "too ingenious and too facile" and "at odds
... with the statutory scheme as a whole." Id. at 426.
514. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979).
515. Id. at 1002 n.55.
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answered affirmatively and a "positive" injunction entered. 516 Preemp-
tion was not discussed as such, because the court correctly assumed that if
the Act applied, it overrode conflicting state regulation.
The Palila decision confirms that state law must comport with federal
law where Congress has acted to conserve or preserve certain wildlife
species. It does not mean that federal agencies are supplanting state agen-
cies or that the latter will become but impotent extensions of the former.
Federal law is limited in its coverage of species. Birds and oceanic mam-
mals are the only broad groups of species protected by federal statutes and
while the list of endangered species is growing, it is unlikely ever to in-
clude more than a small percentage of indigenous wildlife species. There
can be no doubt that federal wildlife law has expanded greatly and that it
predominates where applicable. But in every case the states are accorded
an important place in the federal scheme; the trend clearly is toward a
coordinated system of interjurisdictional management with the state and
federal agencies cooperating in the common goal of enhanced wildlife
populations. The Palila case should go even further than Kleppe in con-
vincing state agencies that cooperative wildlife management is more pro-
ductive and important than adamant defense of historical turf.
VI. CONCLUSION
Federal wildlife law will withstand constitutional challenge and will
preempt conflicting state law.
That conclusion should be the beginning, not the end, of the matter.
Once the beliefs about the inherent right of state agencies to manage wild-
life free of federal influence (but with federal money) are overcome, a
more productive era of wildlife management may emerge. It was the nar-
row orientation and intransigence of states and state agencies, responsible
only to relatively small and self-interested constituencies, that brought the
federal government into the field of wildlife regulation. The federal gov-
ernment is there to stay. When this simple but essential fact is accepted,
new institutional arrangements with enhanced possibilities of success in
the field will be possible.
516. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, Civ. No. 78-0030 (D. Hawaii, July
31, 1979) (Judgment and Order).
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